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THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE MONOPOLY-REFORM
IS NEEDED
JERRY W. MARKHAM*
INTRODUCTION
In theory, the commodity futures markets are the essence of competi-
tion.' All orders are required to be exposed to trading pits where traders
vie competitively and aggressively to assure the best possible execution
price. 2 On the surface, as observed from the exchange galleries or on
television, the exchanges do appear to be highly competitive, particularly
when one views hundreds of traders screaming and gesticulating wildly for
orders. The now famous sting operations on the Chicago exchanges in 1989,
however, have provided dramatic evidence that a dangerous symbiotic
relationship has developed among traders on the floor that is undermining
competition and threatening the integrity of the system.'
* Associate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
1. A commodity futures contract allows the buyer (the "long") to purchase, and the
seller (the "short") to sell, a specified quantity of an identified commodity at a specified
future date. The terms of commodity futures contracts are standardized, which allows the
contracts to be offset on the exchanges. Most futures contracts are settled by offset, which is
done simply by entering into an opposing order. For example, a short seller may also enter
into a long transaction, with the effect that the two obligations effectively cancel each other
out. Because futures contracts are standardized, the only negotiable term is the price, which
is set by an auction process on the floor of the exchanges. Delivery may be required on futures
contracts, but some futures contracts provide only for cash delivery. See Katara v. D.E. Jones
Commodities, Inc., 835 F.2d 966, 967 (2d Cir. 1987); CMCAGO BD. OF TRADE, TiM COMMODITY
TRADING MANuAL 12-13 (1989) [hereinafter COMMODITY TRADING MANuAL]. For a general
discussion of commodity futures trading, see M. POWERs, GETrING STARTED IN COmmODrrY
FuTnuRs TRADING (1983).
2. See 17 C.F.R. § 1.38 (1991) (requiring that commodity futures contracts be executed
competitively and openly on exchange floors). As will be discussed below, Section 4 of the
Commodity Exchange Act also requires that all commodity futures contracts be executed only
on the floors of exchanges that are licensed with the federal government as a "contract
market." 7 U.S.C. § 6 (1988).
3. For news reports on the Chicago sting operation, see FBI Investigation of CME
Markets To Continue After Mixed Results, J. Com., Apr. 24, 1991; Behof, Life in The Pits
Will Never Be The Same, Bus. WK., Feb. 6, 1989, at 32; Pauly, More Shoes Drop in The
Pits, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 6, 1989, at 50; McCormick, The Sting In The Pits, NEWSWEEK, Jan.
30, 1989, at 54; Crawford & Gorman, 3rd Merc Trader In Pleas Deal, Chi. Tribune, Apr. 10,
1991, § 3, at 3, col. 6; Crawford, Community Service in Trader's Plea Deal, Chi. Tribune,
Mar. 28, 1991, § 3, at 1, col. 5; Stern, Prosecutors Outline Fraud Case Against Chicago
Traders, Reuters Business Report, Sept. 11, 1990, B.C. Cycle, Nexis; Sanborn, Have Futures
of Traders Hit the Pits?, Nat'l L.J., June 11, 1990, at 8; Crawford, Defense Bears Down on
Agent in Trader Case, Chi. Tribune, June 2, 1990, § 2, at 1, col. 6; Shapiro, F.B.I. Agent
Under Attack at Trial, N.Y. Times, May 11, 1990, D12, col. 5; Risen, Futures Trial is Simply
About Fraud, Jury Told; Commodities: The Prosecutor in Opening Remarks, Says The Three.
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When these non-competitive arrangements are coupled with the fact
that floor traders enjoy a decided time and place advantage over all persons
off the floor, and since by law all orders must come to the floor for
execution,4 the market loses its surface aura of maximum competition.
Instead, the exchanges may rightly be viewed as having a statutory monopoly
that is undermining competition in the futures industry at the expense of
the public. That statutory monopoly should be broken and effective floor
trading practices and procedures should be established in order to prevent
the type of conduct that was exposed by the Chicago sting operation.
This article will describe the background of futures regulation and the
role now being played by futures trading in the financial markets. The
article will then discuss and propose reforms that are needed to assure
effective regulation. Specifically, Part I of the article will discuss the present
regulatory scheme under the Commodity Exchange Act.5 This part includes
a discussion of the regulatory background of futures trading, and it describes
statutory provisions that are designed to prevent fraud and trading abuses.
Part I of the article also discusses some of the numerous regulatory problems
and concerns that the government has faced in the futures markets, and it
reviews some of the more abusive trading practices that have been uncovered
by the Chicago sting operation.
Part II of the article focuses on a core provision in the Commodity
Exchange Act that requires futures instruments to be traded on licensed
"contract markets. ' 6 Part II suggests that the solution to many of the
Defendants Are Common Thieves, The Defense Will State Its Case Today, L.A. Times, May
10, 1990, D2, col. 3; Shapiro, U.S. Opens Case Against 3 Futures Traders, N.Y. Times, May
10, 1990, D18, col. 4; Eichenwald, Business and the Law; Commodity Charges Wide Use of
Racketeering Statute, N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1989, at DI, col. 1; The Chicago Indictments,
Wash. Post, Aug. 5, 1989, at A16, col. 1; Hargreaves, Agents Posed as Traders in Their Hunt
for Evidence, Fin. Times, Mar. 8, 1989, Survey, at IV; Marx, Only Thin Coverage at F.B.I.
Futures Probe, Chi. Tribune, Feb. 7, 1989, § 1, at 1, col. 2; Horrock, U.S. Widens Probe of
Trading, Chi. Tribune, Feb. 1, 1989, § 1, at 1, col. 2; F.B.I. Commodities 'Sting'. Fast
Money, Secret Lives, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1989, at Al, col. 4; Drew & O'Brien, 2 Agents
Linger, Listening At Exchanges, Chi. Tribune, Jan. 26, 1989, § 1, at 1, col. 5; Jouzatis &
Gaines, Trading Probe Intensifies; 200 Subpoenaes Are Issued, Chi. Tribune, Jan. 25, 1989,
§ 1, at 1, col. 4; Berg, Commodity Case Seen Expanding, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1989, at Dl,
col. 6; Burton & Crawford, Farm Firm's Complaint Led to Probe, Chi. Tribune, Jan. 22,
1989, § 1, at 1, col. 1; Gunset & Cohen, Probe Shatters Exchanges' Club Atmosphere, Chi.
Tribune, Jan. 22, 1989, § 1, at 14, col. 1; Eichenwald, FBI Intensifying Commodity Inquiry
on Chicago Trades, N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1989, at 1, col. 1; Coil & Marcus, Undercover
Probe Targets Chicago Exchanges, Wash. Post, Jan. 20, 1989, at Al, col. 4; Drew & Crawford,
How FBI Worked Trader Sting, Chi. Tribune, Jan. 20, 1989, § 1, at 1, col. 2; Drew &
Crawford, FBI Tape Key to Fraud Investigation, Chi. Tribune, Jan. 19, 1989, § I, at 1, col.
6.
A book has also been published on the Chicago Sting Operation. See D. GREISING & L.
MORSE, BROKERS, BAGMEN AND MOLES-FRAUD AND CORRUPTION IN THE CHICAGO FUTURES
MARKETS (1991) [hereinafter BROKERS AND BAGMEN].
4. 7 U.S.C. § 6 (1988).
5. 7 U.S.C. § 1-26 (1988).
6. See 7 U.S.C. § 6 (1988).
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present regulatory shortcomings is to loosen this statutory monopoly so that
competition may operate more fully. This approach will assure that the
marketplace, and not artificial regulatory barriers, determines whether par-
ticular commodity interests are traded on the exchanges., Part II also
proposes that public representation be required on the boards of the
exchanges as well as their committees so that the power of the exchanges,
which has long been used to block regulatory reforms, is diluted.
Part III discusses some other shortcomings in the present regulatory
system that have fostered and encouraged the abuses exposed by the Chicago
sting operation. This part also addresses some gaps in the Commodity
Exchange Act that prevent effective regulation and it proposes reforms in
the manner in which futures trading is conducted on the floors of the
exchanges so as to assure maximum competition and efficiency.
I. THE PRESENT REGULATORY SCHEME AND ITS BACKGROUND
1. Background
Commodity futures trading evolved from the grain marketing problems
that arose in the 1800s in the midwest when farmers would bring their grain
to market after the harvest. The market would then become so flooded
with grain that prices would drop drastically-often to levels far below
production and transportation costs. At such time, grain would be dumped
in the streets and left to rot. Later, as surpluses were used up, grain
shortages would occur and prices would skyrocket. Crop failures and
transportation problems compounded this boom and bust cycle. To alleviate
these conditions "forward" contracts were developed. These were simply
contracts for the delivery of grain at a time specified in the future rather
than for immediate delivery. These forward, or "to arrive," contracts helped
stabilize the market because farmers could sell their grain in advance for
set prices and specified delivery dates. They could then store the grain either
in their own facilities, or at local elevators, until the grain was needed. This
also stabilized the supply situation for processors and users of the grain.7
These forward contracts evolved into futures contracts with standardized
terms. That is, the quantity and grade of the commodity and the delivery
date became standardized with the only negotiated feature being the price.
This permitted traders to offset their contracts with each other, which
facilitated negotiations and allowed contracts, in effect, to be resold. This
7. See COMMODITY TRADING MANUAL, supra note 1, at 3-4; W. CRONON, NATURE'S
METROPOLIS: CHICAGO AND THE GREAT WEST 123-125 (1991); T. HIERONYMUS, ECONOMICS OF
FUTURES TRADING 72-76 (2d ed. 1980); G. HOFFMAN, HEDGING BY DEALING IN GRAIN FUTURES
15 (1925); J. MARKHAM, THE HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING AND ITS REGULATION
3-4 (1987).
1991]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:977
standardization also allowed speculation in these contracts. Speculation
quickly became widespread.'
Abuses soon followed, including efforts to corner the grain markets by
maintaining large futures positions coupled with purchases of available
deliverable supplies.9 This required sellers of futures contracts to close their
contracts at artificial prices demanded by the cornering party. There was
also widespread concern that speculators in Chicago were driving grain
prices down to levels below production costs, which created much animosity
on the part of populists and members of Congress. As a result, numerous
bills were introduced in Congress to regulate grain futures trading.
A related problem involved off-exchange transactions where individuals
and brokers engaged in betting on differences in commodity prices. The
operation of these so-called "bucket" shops became widespread. Unfortu-
nately, when customers made large gains, the bucket shops often folded up
and their customers never received their profits. 0 Efforts were made to stop
the bucket shops by labeling such transactions as gambling contracts and a
considerable body of case law and numerous state statutes were developed
to regulate such trading." These efforts were largely unsuccessful and wagers
8. See COMMODITY TRADING MANUAL, supra note 1, at 5; W. CRONON, supra note 7,
at 125-132; II FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION REPORT ON THE GRAIN TRADE 108-109 (1920)
[hereinafter II REPORT ON GRAIN TRADE]; G. HoFFMAN, FUTURE TRADING UPON ORGANIZED
COMMODITY MARKETS IN THE UNITED STATES 18 (1932).
9. See Markham, Manipulation of Commodity Futures Prices-The Unprosecutable
Crime, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 281, 289-290 (1991).
10. See Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 243 (1905); A. FABIAN,
CARD SHARPs, DREAM BOOKS & BUCKET SHOPS (1990); II REPORT ON GRAIN TRADE, supra
note 8, at 121-128; 5 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION REPORT ON THE GRAIN TRADE 329 (1924)
[hereinafter 5 REPORT ON TIE GRAIN TRADE]; J. LURIE, THE CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE, 1859-
1905 76-78 (1939); Van Smith, The Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the Return
of the Bucketeers: A Lesson in Regulatory Failure, 57 N.D.L. Rv. 7, 13, n.26 (1981); Note,
Federal Regulation of Commodity Futures Trading, 60 YALE L.J. 822 (1951). Although the
origin of the term bucket-shop is obscure, one author has determined that it:
was first used in the late [18] '70s, but it is very evident that it was coined in
London as many as fifty years ago, when it had absolutely no reference to any
species of speculation or gambling. It appears that beer swillers from the East Side
(London) went from street to street with a bucket, draining every keg they came
across and picking up cast-off cigar butts. Arriving at a den, they gathered for
social amusement around a table and passed the bucket as a loving cup, each taking
a "pull" as it came his way. In the interval there were smoking and rough jokes.
The den soon came to be called a bucketshop. Later on the term was applied, both
in England and the United States, as a byword of reproach, to small places where
grain and stock deals were counterfeited.
J. HILL, GOLD BRICKS OF SPECULATION 39 (1904).
11. See generally T. DEWEY, A TREATISE ON CONTRACTS FOR FUTURE DELWVERY AND
COMMERCIAL WAGERS INCLUDING OPTIONS, FUTURES AND SHORT SALES (1886); T. DEWEY,
LEGISLATION AGAINST SPECULATION AND GAMBLING IN THE FORMS OF TRADE (1905); J. Dos
PASSOS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF STOCK-BROKERS AND STOCK-ExcHANGES 406-410 (1882);
Pratt, American Contract Law at the Turn of the Century, 39 S.C.L. REv. 415 (1988); Taylor,
Trading in Commodity Futures-A New Standard of Legality?, 43 YALE L.J. 63 (1933); Van
Smith, Preventing the Manipulation of Commodity Futures Markets: To Deliver or Not to
Deliver?, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 1569, 1573-1579 (1981).
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spread to the oil markets 12 and even to the stock market where traders were
allowed to speculate on price changes in the same manner as they could
speculate in price changes on grain. In Justh v. Holliday,3 for example, a
brokerage firm sought to enforce a note against a decedent's estate. The
decedent had given the note for losses resulting from his betting on stock
price differences. The court concluded that such transactions were unen-
forceable gambling transactions because the decedent had not purchased or
received title to any stocks. Moreover, the decedent did not have the financial
wherewithal to purchase the amount of stocks upon which the difference
trading was conducted. This was a victory for the decedent's estate, but the
decedent himself, General George Armstrong Custer, lost an even bigger
gamble at the Little Bighorn shortly after the issuance of the note in
question. 14
Legislative efforts to regulate futures trading both on and off the
exchanges were unsuccessful until 1921 when the Futures Trading Act of
1921 was adopted. 5 This statute, which was based on the taxation powers
of Congress, imposed a prohibitive tax on futures transactions that were
not conducted on an exchange licensed by the federal government. Exchanges
so licensed were also required to prevent manipulation of prices. Although
the Supreme Court held that this legislation was an unconstitutional exten-
sion of the Congressional taxing power, 16 the next year Congress enacted
essentially the same statute under its authority to regulate interstate com-
merce. This statute, the Grain Futures Act, 7 was upheld by the Supreme
Court.'
The Grain Futures Act proved to be ineffective in preventing market
abuses. To cite one example, the Commodity Exchange Commission, which
administered the Act, held that trading practices which appeared to be
nearly identical to those exposed in the Chicago sting operation did not fall
12. Speculation was conducted in so-called oil "certificates" on various oil exchanges in
the 1880s, until the Standard Oil Company used its monopoly power to stop their operations.
See P. GIDDENS, THE EARLY PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 182-183 (1974); D. YERGIN, THn PRizE,
THE Epic QUEST FOR OIL, MONE, AND POWER 53 (1991); Barbour, Sketch of the Pittsburgh
Oil Exchanges, 11 W. PA. HIST. MAG. 127 (1928). The Standard Oil trust destroyed the
exchanges because its own existence "depended on the ability of the company to fix oil prices
for virtually the entire industry." R. SmTH, THE MONEY WARS, THE RIsE AND FALL OF TBE
GREAT BuYotrr Boom OF THE 1980s 49 (1990).
13. 13 D.C. (2 Mackey) 346 (1883), noted in Pratt, supra note 11, at 452, n.125.
14. See generally E. CONNELL, THE SON OF THE MORNNG STAR, CUSTER AND THE LITTLE
BIG HoRN (1981). Commodity futures traders continue to defend themselves against charges
that they are gamblers. See Rogers & Markham, The Application of West German Statutes to
United States Commodity Futures Contracts: An Unnecessary Clash of Policies, 19 GEo. J.L.
& POL'Y INT'L Bus. 273 (1987); Potts & Lippman, Is This Any Way to Set Oil Prices?, Wash.
Post, Jan. 12, 1991, at Al, col. 4; McMurray, A Losing Proposition, Futures Trading is
'Usually a No-Win Game for the Small Investor, Wall St. J., Oct. 19, 1990, at R4, col. 1.
15. Future Trading Act of 1921, ch. 86, 42 Stat. 187 (1921) (repealed 1922).
16. Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 68 (1922).
17. Grain Futures Act, ch. 369, 42 Stat. 998 (1922).
18. Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 839 (1923).
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within the prohibitions against manipulation in the Grain Futures Act. The
Commission stated that, while such transactions might be fraudulent, they
were not manipulative and, therefore, were not subject to the prohibitions
of the Grain Futures Act.1 9 The Supreme Court also later held that a party
manipulating the markets could not be the subject of disciplinary action by
the Secretary of Agriculture unless disciplinary action was imposed before
the manipulation had been completed. 20 Legal processes, however, simply
did not permit the completion of such an action before a manipulation
could be effectuated. Consequently, the Act was effectively gutted.
The stock market crash of 1929 was accompanied by a drastic decline
in grain prices and, with the election of Franklin Roosevelt, a presidential
call went out for legislation concerning both securities and commodities. 2'
Much of the securities legislation was adopted before 1934-i.e., the Secu-
rities Act of 193322 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.23 Commodities
legislation, however, was not enacted until 1936. It also took a much
different route from that of the securities legislation, which was handled by
the banking committees. Instead, commodity futures regulation fell within
the province of the agricultural committees. The result was the Commodity
Exchange Act of 1936.24
The Commodity Exchange Act differed in many respects from the
securities legislation that was adopted during the New Deal. For example,
the Commodity Exchange Act carried forward the concept of the Futures
Trading Act that all futures contracts must be traded on a licensed exchange
called a "contract market.'' 25 Unlike the securities industry, no over-the-
counter trading is permitted in futures contracts. Another concept that was
carried forward in the Commodity Exchange Act was that of a regulatory
oversight body called the Commodity Exchange Commission. Rather than
being an independent federal agency, such as the SEC, the Commodity
Exchange Commission was composed of the Secretaries of the Departments
of Agriculture and Commerce and the Attorney General of the United
States. Day-to-day regulation of the statute was given to the Secretary of
Agriculture who assigned this duty to an agency within the department, the
Commodity Exchange Authority (CEA).26
The Commodity Exchange Act prohibited manipulation. 27 However,
unlike the federal securities laws, 28 the Act did not identify particular
19. Secretary of Agriculture v. Massey, Docket Nos. 2-3 (G.F.A. 1933), noted in
Regulation of Commodity Exchanges, Hearing Before the House Committee on Agriculture
On H.R. 3009 (Commodity Exchange Act), 74th Cong., Ist Sess. 69-72 (1935).
20. Wallace v. Cutten, 298 U.S. 229, 236-37 (1936).
21. See H.R. REP. No. 421, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1935).
22. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1988).
23. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1988).
24. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1988).
25. See 7 U.S.C. § 6 (1988).
26. See H.R. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
27. 7 U.S.C. §§ 7(d), 9, 13(b) (1988).
28. See 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1988) (identifying particular practices that constitute manipu-
lation under Securities Exchange Act).
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practices that would constitute such. conduct, and it did not define what
the term manipulation meant. The Commodity Exchange Act prohibited
fraud, but only narrowly and in the most convoluted terms. 29 Further, unlike
the federal securities laws,30 the Act did not give a federal regulatory agency
authority to adopt rules broadly prohibiting fraud or to define even more
specifically fraudulent or manipulative practices that should be prohibited. 3'
The Act prohibited specific trading practices such as "wash" sales, "ficti-
tious" trades and "accommodation" trading, but did not define these
terms.32
The Commodity Exchange Act also imposed registration requirements
on brokers on the floors of the exchanges 33-i.e., on traders who executed
customer's orders on the exchanges 4-- but it did not attempt to regulate
individuals on the floors who were trading for their own accounts. Brokerage
firms were required to register as "futures commission merchants" (FCMs),35
but little substantive regulation was imposed other than a provision that
required customer funds to be maintained as segregated trust accounts.3 6
The most substantive regulatory effort was directed at position limits, which
precluded speculators from establishing positions larger than those specified
by the Secretary of Agriculture. 37 However, these limits were not applied
to commercial traders, even though commercial traders have a history of
disrupting the markets. 31
29. See 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1988). As the Second Circuit has stated, "while the intent to
outlaw fraud is clear," the statute's "syntactical mess" and its "crabbed" language make "it
difficult to answer some basic questions about coverage." Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 322-
323 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd sub nom. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456
U.S. 353 (1982).
30. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (giving broad authority to Securities and Exchange Commission
to adopt anti-fraud regulations). It was under this provision that Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § lOb-
5, was adopted. That regulation has been the subject of literally thousands of judicial
proceedings. See generally 5-5d A. JAcoBs, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE 10B-5
(1990).
31. In 1974, Congress granted the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) the
authority under the Commodity Exchange Act to promulgate such rules and regulations as in
the judgment of the Commission are necessary to accomplish any of the purposes of the
Commodity Exchange Act or to implement any of its provisions. See 7 U.S.C. § 12a(5) (1988).
The CFTC, however, has not often utilized that authority as a broad independent rulemaking
authorization. But see In re ContiCommodity Services, Inc., 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
25,038, at 37,880, n.15 (C.F.T.C. 1991). Nevertheless, the courts seem willing to hold that
this provision gives the CFTC broad rulemaking authority. See British American Commodity
Options Corp. v. Bagley, 552 F.2d 482, 486 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 937 (1977); but
see Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (rejecting SEC requirement
that exchanges adopt one vote one share rule under broad statutory language that authorizes
SEC to amend exchange rules).
32. See 7 U.S.C. § 6c (1988).
33. See 7 U.S.C. § 6e (1988).
34. See 7 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1988).
35. 7 U.S.C. § 6d (1988).
36. See id.
37. See 7 U.S.C. § 6a (1988).
38. See Markham, supra note 9, at 285-98.
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The Commodity Exchange Act had several other inherent weaknesses
and limitations. For example, its terms applied only to specified commodities
and the continued expansion of commodity futures trading on other com-
modities required frequent amendments to the statute. 9 Ultimately, as
trading expanded to such "world" commodities as coffee, cocoa and sugar,
Congress was unable to keep pace with the rapid development of new
markets by such piecemeal amendments.4 0
These deficiencies became apparent early in the tenure of the CEA, but
Congress declined to act until the 1970s, when a virtual explosion of prices
in the commodity markets occurred.4 1 This caused much anguish in Congress
as consumers sought to lay the blame for these price increases on speculators
and abuses in the commodity markets.4 2 Failures in so-called "naked"
comrhodity options and other problems led to a Congressional conclusion
that it could no longer permit the CEA to act as the regulator under the
Commodity Exchange Act.4 3 Consequently, Congress adopted the Commod-
ity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974.4 Among other things, it
created the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and gave it
"exclusive" jurisdiction over futures and commodity options trading.4s This
legislation allowed the CFTC to impose civil penalties of up to $100,000
per violation in administrative proceedings.4 6 It also authorized the CFTC
to seek injunctive relief in the federal courts to prevent violations from
occurring47 and it gave the CFTC the authority to require the exchanges to
take emergency actions in the event of manipulations or other emergencies
in the markets. 4
2. Continued Regulatory Problems and Concerns
The CFTC was plagued in its early years by serious organizational
problems and it faced a number of crises that raised grave concerns as to
its ability to regulate the futures markets. 49 For example, the CFTC almost
39. See H.R. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1974).
40. See id. at 82; S. REP. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 19, 47 (1974).
41. See Markham, supra note 9, at 328-31.
42. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 47-48 (1974); 120 CoNG. REc.
16,134 (1974) (statement of Sen. Hart); 120 CoNG. REc. 2938 (1974) (statement of Rep. Smith);
120 CONG. REc. 2928 (1974) (statement of Rep. Abrams); D. MORGAN, MERCHANTS OF GRAIN
121 (1979) (discussing "Great Grain Robbery" that involved large grain purchases by Soviet
Union, causing large price increases in grain).
43. See H.R. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 37-38, 48 (1974); 120 CONG. REc. 2928
(statement of Rep. Brown).
44. Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 (1974).
45. See 7 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1988).
46. See 7 U.S.C. § 9 (1988).
47. See 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1 (1988).
48. See 7 U.S.C. § 12a(9) (1988).
49. See Investigative Study on the Commodity Futures Trading Commission; Report to
the House Committee on Appropriations by Mr. Whitten for Use by the Subcommittee on
Agriculture, Rural Development and Related Agencies, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); J.
MARKHAM, supra note 7, at 97-101.
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immediately allowed commodity options trading to commence once again.
This trade soon turned into a national scandal when it was discovered that
the head of one large firm was actually an escaped felon.5 0 In addition, the
CFTC faced a debacle in the potatoes futures market when an unprecedented
default in 1976 disrupted trading and shook public confidence in the futures
markets. 5' Thereafter, the Hunt family in Dallas, Texas made an assault on
the soybean market in 1977,52 which was followed by their involvement in
the so-called silver crisis of 1980.53 In the latter, the Hunts were accused of
attempting to corner the entire silver market, a tale that has become as
legendary as Jay Gould's attempted corner of the gold market in the 1860s.5 4
The CFTC encountered other difficulties that involved its "exclusive" '55
jurisdiction over futures trading. Early in its existence the CFTC approved
the concept of trading futures contracts on GNMA securities. The SEC
objected to the CFTC's action, contending that such contracts were within
its jurisdiction. The CFTC ignored that objection.5 6
The SEC fought back. The CFTC is subject to a reauthorization or
"sunset" provision which periodically requires the Congress to review the
CFTC's operations. In the course of the first of the CFTC's sunset hearings
in 1978, the SEC attempted to convince Congress that the SEC should be
given a portion of the CFTC's jurisdiction, contending that the CFTC was
not qualified to regulate trading on financial markets. This effort was
unsuccessful.5 7
Thereafter, the SEC authorized the Chicago Board Options Exchange,
an exchange regulated by the SEC, to conduct trading in options on GNMA
contracts. The Chicago Board of Trade, however, sued and was successful
in stopping the SEC from allowing this contract to proceed.58 In 1982,
however, that decision was mooted when the CFTC and the SEC agreed to
50. See Markham & Gilberg, Stock and Commodity Options-Two Regulatory Ap-
proaches and Their Conflicts, 47 ALB. L. REv. 741, 763-64 (1983).
51. See Strobl v. New York Mercantile Exch., 768 F.2d 22, 23 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 1006 (1985) (commenting that "[t]his was the largest default in the history of
commodities futures trading").
52. See CFTC v. Hunt, 591 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 921 (1979).
53. See H.R. RPi. No. 565, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., Part I at 61-71 (1982); H.R. REP.
No. 395, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) ; REPORT OF THE STAFF OF THE SEcuRrEs AND EXCHANGE
CoMMISSION, THE SLVER CIsIs oF 1980 (Oct. 1982); CFTC, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS IN
RESPONSE TO SECTION 21 OF THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT (June 1980).
54. See H.R. REP. No. 31, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. (1870); K. AcKERMAN, Tim GOLD RING
(1988); M. KLEIN, THE LIE AND LEGEND OF JAY GoULD 99-115 (1986).
55. See 7 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1988).
56. See Securities and Exchange Commission-Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Jurisdictional Correspondence [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep (CCH) 20,117
(C.F.T.C. 1975).
57. See Markham & Gilberg, supra note 50, at 774-76; see also Young, A Test of Federal
Sunset: Congressional Reauthorization of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 27
EMORY L.J. 853 (1978).
58. See Board of Trade v. SEC, 677 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir.), vacated as moot, 459 U.S.
1026 (1982).
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resolve their differences through an agreement negotiated by their respective
chairmen.5 9 In brief, the CFTC retained its exclusive jurisdiction over all
futures trading and the CFTC assumed exclusive jurisdiction over commodity
options trading, except that the SEC assumed jurisdiction over options on
currency on national securities exchanges. The CFTC took exclusive juris-
diction over options on futures contracts. The agreement prohibited futures
trading on individual securities, and authorized the SEC to allow trading
of options on stock indexes on securities exchanges. The SEC also assumed
what amounted to a veto power over the CFTC's approval of additional
stock index futures contracts. °
This peace settlement was short lived. Shortly after Congressional ap-
proval of the "Shad-Johnson Accords," the SEC and the CFTC became
embroiled in a dispute over the manner in which subindexes of stocks should
be approved. 61 While that dispute was resolved, another dispute continued
over whether the Federal Reserve Board should be given authority to regulate
margins on futures contracts, particularly financial futures contracts. The
Federal Reserve Board has regulated margins on securities since the 1930s, 62
and some argued that it should be given similar authority over financial
futures. The CFTC resisted and Congress declined to grant that authority. 63
Nevertheless, the controversy continues even today.64
These jurisdictional disputes were not the only problems encountered
by the CFTC. Indeed, it faced almost yearly crises in the market, including
a 1979 coffee manipulation 6 and a market threat in the March 1979 wheat
contract that resulted in the CFTC's declaration of a market emergency. 6
59. See Joint Explanatory Statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission and
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) 21,332 (C.F.T.C. 1982).
60. See Horwitz & Markham, Sunset on the Commodity Futures Trading Commission:
Scene I, 39 Bus. LAw. 67, 72-74 (1983).
61. See Kane, Regulatory Structure in the Futures Markets Jurisdictional Competition
Between the SEC, the CFTC, and Other Agencies, 4 J. FUT. MARKETs 367, 375 (1984); Ferrara
& Chase, SEC-CFTC Accord: One Year Later, an Uneasy Peace, Legal Times, Jan. 30, 1984,
at 15, col. 1.
62. See 15 U.S.C. § 78g(a) (1988). The Federal Reserve Board has, for example, adopted
regulations governing margin requirements under Regulation T for credit extended by broker-
dealers and Regulation U for bank loans.
63. See generally Markham, Federal Regulation of Margin in the Commodity Futures
Industry-History and Theory, 64 TEMPLE L. REv. 59 (1991).
64. See 137 CoNG. REc. S905 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1991) (statement of Sen. Leahy);
Salwen, House Panel Votes to Curb Futures Trading, Wall St. J., Feb. 20, 1991, at Cl, col.
3.
65. See In re Compania Salvadorena de Cafe, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut.
L. Rep. (CCH) 21,886 (C.F.T.C. 1983).
66. See Board of Trade v. CFTC, 605 F.2d 1016 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
928 (1980); CFTC Reauthorization, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Conservation, Credit
and Rural Development of the House Committee on Agriculture on H.R. 5447, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess. 717-722 (1982); March Wheat Futures Trading on the Chicago Board of Trade,
Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Conservation and Credit of the House Committee on
Agriculture, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1979).
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Perhaps the gravest crisis of all arose in the form of the October 1987 stock
market crash. The extent of the crash has been well documented by a
Presidential Commission and numerous governmental and private reports.6 7
The problems encountered in the Stock Market Crash of 1987 were
examined by the Brady Commission, which had been appointed by President
Reagan to examine the crash and propose reforms.6 8 The Commission
concluded that intermarket coordination of regulation was needed. The
Brady Commission further contended that additional regulatory safeguards
should be imposed, including the harmonization of margins between the
securities and commodity futures markets. So-called "circuit" breakers were
recommended that would, for example, suspend trading when prices reached
pre-specified levels.69 Some of those proposals were adopted but many
became the subject of extensive debate between the securities and commodity
futures industries.7 0 The commodity futures industry sought to stop the SEC
from assuming jurisdictional control over the commodities industry and the
SEC utilized the problems engendered by the stock market crash to advance
once again the position that it should be given regulatory authority over
futures contracts on stock indexes. A mini-stock market crash in 1989
renewed the cry for legislative reform.7 '
3. The Chicago Sting
Perhaps the most significant regulatory event in the futures industry in
recent years was the announcement in early 1989 that the office of the
United States Attorney in Chicago had conducted massive undercover op-
erations on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and the Chicago Board of
67. See, e.g., DIvisiON OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND DIVISION OF TRADING AND MARKETS,
CFTC FINAL REPORT ON STOCK INDEX AND CASH MARKET ACTIVITY DURING OCTOBER 1987
To THE COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION (1988); N. KATZENBACH, AN OVERVIEW OF
PROGRAM TRADING AND ITS IMPACT ON CURRENT MARKET PRACTICES (1987); REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKEr MECHANISMS (Jan. 8, 1988) [hereinafter TASK FORCE
ON MARKET MECHANISMS].
In brief, on October 14, 1987, the "U.S. equity market began the most severe one-week
decline in its history." TASK FORCE ON MARKET MECHANISMS, supra, at 15. From the morning
of Wednesday, October 14 to the following Tuesday, the Dow Jones Industrial Average
plummeted almost 700 points. On Black Monday alone, October 19, 1987, the Dow Jones
index dropped 508 points. This was twice the percentage drop of 1929's worst day. Id. at 15-
42. On October 20, 1987, the markets nearly "approached breakdown" because of the almost
complete disconnection of the futures and stock markets. Id. at 42.
68. Id.
69. Id.; see also Santoni, Circuit Breakers Make the Market More Volatile, Wall St. J.,
Dec. 11, 1990, at A18, col. 3.
70. See, e.g., Volatile Reactions, ECONOMIST, July 21, 1990, Survey, at 22; Salwen,
Regulators View Markets' Steep Descent Also As Example of Controls That Work, Wall St.
J., Aug. 27, 1990, at C15, col. 1; Shapiro, Circuit Breakers, Maybe They Work, Maybe They
Don't, N.Y. Times, July 29, 1990, § 3, at 7, col. 1; Shapiro, Circuit Breakers Help Index
Futures Recover, N.Y. Times, July 24, 1990, at D6, col. 1.
71. See generally Markham, supra note 63.
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Trade.7 Disguised FBI agents acted as traders on the exchange floors and
tape recorded their conversations with traders. The result was the indictment
of forty-six traders, charging hundreds of violations of federal laws. The
trials in those actions have not been a complete success for the government.
73
72. See supra note 3. The Chicago sting operation was "unprecedented" in that FBI
agents posed as futures traders for more than a year. See McMurray, Sting Isn't Biting In
Commodities Probe, Wall St. J., Jan. 2, 1991, at R20, col. 1.
73. A total of forty-six individuals were initially indicted and two other traders were
later added to that list. See McMurray, Ten Soybean Futures Traders Convicted in Major
Victory for U.S. Fraud Inquiry, Wall St. J., Jan. 10, 1991, at C13, col. 1; McMurray, supra
note 72, at R20, col. 1. The trials were conducted in three groups. In the first trial, which
concerned the Swiss franc pit, the government was not successful in proving many of its
charges. See Futures Trader Mosky Receives a Sentence of 4 Months in Prison, Wall St. J.,
July 17, 1991, at C16, col. 6 (reporting that yen trader sentenced to four months, $40,000
fine, $7,000 in restitution and 600 hours of community service); Ex-Merc Trader Pleads Guilty
to One Fraud Count, Wall St. J., Mar. 20, 1991, at A8, col. 5 (reporting that trader convicted
of seven counts of commodity fraud in Swiss franc trial also pled guilty to wire fraud count
involving cheating customers of $12.50 to dispose of additional charges); McMurray, supra
note 72, at R20, col. 1 (explaining that in government's first trial involving Swiss bank traders,
two traders were found guilty on a few counts, one was acquitted on certain counts and jury
remained deadlocked on two-thirds of over one hundred counts in indictment; that government
asserted there would be retrial, but "the probe appears to be petering out"; and that the low
number of traders indicted and convicted was "a far cry from the expectations raised by
government in mid-January of 1989"). Later, in the soybean pit trial, the government was
successful in proving most of its charges. See Weir, CBT Soybean Convictions Could Spur
More Investigations, Indictments, J. Com., Jan. 11, 1991 (reporting that soybean jurors were
unswayed by claims that small dollar amounts involved were minor when compared to millions
of dollars in leverage provided by futures contracts); Roundup, Wash. Post, June 19, 1991,
at B2, col. 3 (reporting that soybean trader put on probation fined and ordered to make
restitution); CFTC Files Action Against 10 Traders Convicted In Fraud, Wall St. J., June 7,
1991, at A7, col. 5 (reporting that CFTC seeking further sanctions in civil proceedings against
convicted soybean traders); Soybean Trader Sentenced to 27 Months In Prison, Wall St. J.,
June 3, 1991, at A5, col. 3 (reporting that other soybean traders received probation and one
trader was sentenced to 27 months in prison); Taylor, Soybean Traders at CBOT Receive Stiff
Sentences, Wall St. J., May 28, 1991, at C16, col. 6 (reporting that sentences for convicted
soybean traders ranged from over three years to probation); Dishneau, 10 Convicted of Fraud
in Commodities Case, Wash. Post, Jan. 10, 1991, at E3, col. 6 (reporting that 10 traders in
soybean pit convicted of racketeering charges and mail or wire fraud; one broker was acquitted
of racketeering); McMurray, Ten Soybean Futures Traders Convicted in Major Victory for
U.S. Fraud Inquiry, Wall St. J., Jan. 10, 1991, at C13, col. 1 (reporting that "[miore
indictments of futures traders are expected in coming months"). However, the jury in the
Japanese yen pit trial announced that they were hung on many of the charges, even after an
"Allen dynamite" charge from the judge ordering them to reach some resolution. The same
jury also acquitted some of the defendants. See Two Former Yen Traders Plead Guilty, Wall
St. J., May 2, 1991, at C14, col. 6 (reporting that one trader pled guilty to racketeering charge
and another to wire fraud); McMurray, U.S. Fails to Win Any Convictions Over Yen Trading,
Wall St. J., Mar. 14, 1991, at CIl, col. 3 (reporting that verdict in yen pit "was a reversal
for the government, which had hoped that its lopsided courtroom victory against 10 soybean
futures traders from the Chicago Board of Trade in January had given the probe much needed
momentum"); Shapiro, No Convictions in Trial of Yen Futures Traders, N.Y. Times, Mar.
14, 1991, at D2, col. 5 (reporting that many Chicago lawyers believed that setback in yen trial
would discourage government from pursuing futures cases); 12 Yen Futures Traders Acquitted
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They have, however, shown that illegal after hours trading and petty theft
is prevalent on the floors of the commodity exchanges.
The Chicago sting operation also revealed that a widespread, pernicious
and symbiotic relationship exists between "floor brokers" who execute
customer orders74 and so-called "locals" who trade for their own accounts."
This situation has developed as a result of the fact that the locals and floor
brokers enjoy a statutory monopoly over the handling and execution of
orders on the exchange floor. As will be described below, the Commodity
Exchange Act requires all customer orders to be transmitted to the floor
for execution by a floor broker. 76 The customer order flow handled by floor
brokers is a prime source of profitability for the locals, who trade for their
own accounts. The locals feed off that order flow and they profit even
more to the extent they can obtain executions from floor brokers at non-
competitive prices.
Floor brokers are willing to provide non-competitive prices because they
are susceptible to errors that can cost them thousands of dollars. As shown
on Most Charges, Wash. Post, Mar. 14, 1991, at B14, col. 1 (discussing verdict in yen pit
trial); see also Crawford, Jubilant Merc Chiefs Blast Probe, Chi. Tribune, Mar. 14, 1991, at
1, col. 2 (reporting that officials of Chicago Mercantile Exchange claim that Chicago sting
operation turned up only minor abuses at great cost to government and to defendants); Gorman
& Cohen, Jury Acquits 2, Splits on 10 in Trader Trial, Chi. Tribune, Mar. 14, 1991, at 1,
col. 6 (describing jury deliberations as hostile and reporting that defense attorneys stated that
government is likely to indict twenty or thirty additional traders as result of sting operation);
McMurray, More Traders Are Expected to Plead Guilty in Chicago Commodities Probe, Wall
St. J., Jan. 11, 1991, at C13, col. 3 (reporting that several traders in sting operation were
"charged with stealing only a few thousand dollars from customers, leading critics to claim
that the government was too heavy-handed in its investigation").
74. The Commodity Exchange Act requires individuals executing customer orders to
register with the CFTC as floor brokers. 7 U.S.C. § 6e (1988).
75. COMMODrry TRADiNG MANUAL, supra note 1, at 37 (explaining that "locals are traders
who 'trade for their own account and speculate on future price movements"'). Floor traders
and locals are not required to register with the CFTC. The omission of a registration
requirement for floor traders has led to embarrassing incidents in the past when it was
discovered that individuals on the floor of the exchanges were convicted felons or had previously
abused customer orders. For example, one floor trader had been barred from registration by
the CFTC because of a felony conviction, but he continued to trade on an exchange floor as
a local, where he engaged in broad scale fraudulent operations. See CFTC v. Savage, 611
F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1979); Savage v. CFTC, 548 F.2d 192 (7th Cir. 1977); BROKERS AND
BAGMEN, supra note 3, at 96-97, 147-48.
The sting operation in Chicago has given rise to the concern that more substantive
regulation should be imposed on floor traders, as well as floor brokers. Proposed legislation
would impose a registration requirerient on these locals. See H.R. 2869, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 205 (1989); S. REP. No. 22, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15 (1991); H.R. REP. No. 236, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). Proposed regulations may also require registration of floor broker
associations so that better surveillance can be maintained over groups of brokers who act
together and possibly commit fraud. Proposed Regulation Requiring Registration of Broker
Associations, 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,804 (C.F.T.C. Apr. 11, 1990). However, the
Bush Administration is seeking to block that proposal. Comm. Fut. L. Rep. No. 400, pt. 2,
Mar. 11, 1991, at 2.
76. 7 U.S.C. § 6 (1988).
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by the Chicago sting operation, the locals, in exchange for non-competitive
executions, often cover up these errors. The locals are then repaid or prepaid
by kickbacks from profits obtained by cheating other customers of the floor
broker. Indeed, the Chicago sting operation revealed that floor brokers
established elaborate banks or pools with locals that were built up by
cheating customers so that floor broker errors could be covered and floor
traders allowed to profit without competition. 77
Government witnesses testified that these trading practices included what
were identified as "edges," "leads," "matches," and "trading off" an
order.7 8 An "edge" seems to be simply a competitive advantage that
particular traders are given over other traders because of their willingness
to trade in large volume with floor brokers that are executing customer
orders. This assists the trader given the edge to buy at the bid and sell at
the offering price, or vice versa, thereby profiting on the spread between
the bid and ask prices in the pit. The giving of an edge by a floor broker
is designed to reward large floor traders who are willing to participate in
large volume at or near current market levels and who will cover errors of
the broker, as for example, by taking trades that were missed by the floor
broker because of chaotic market conditions. Although giving an edge to a
large floor trader does not guarantee him a profit and is not viewed to be
a payback to cover errors, the floor trader is better assured of a profit
because of the competitive advantage he is given. The giving of an edge,
therefore, may deliberately exclude competition from the order execution
process .9
An ever more malignant form of trading is the so-called "lead." Simply
stated, a lead is an order given by a floor broker to a floor trader at a
price that is slightly different from that existing at other points in the
trading pit. This allows the floor trader to accept the customer order and
immediately execute an opposite trade with another trader in the pit to
obtain a profit. A lead does not guarantee a profit because market conditions
77. See Plea Agreement of Sam Cali, U.S. v. Cali, No. 89CR668-4 at 2-4 (N.D. I11. plea
agreement filed May 1, 1991) (trader admits his role in these activities); BROKERS AND BAGMEN,
supra note 3, at 204 (discussing "banks" created by "bagmen" who accepted fraudulent trades
from floor brokers); Dishneau, 10 Convicted of Fraud in Commodities Case, Wash. Post,
Jan. 10, 1991, at E3, col. 5 (describing allegations concerning 'curb trading,' part of a
conspiracy in which brokers illegally passed personal losses from trading errors on to cooperative
independent traders in return for guarantees of later profitable trades"); Burns, Broker's
Taped Lament to Agent: Honesty is Costly, Chi. Sun-Times, Nov. 15, 1990, at 58, col. 1
(reporting that defendant told undercover FBI agent that "busy brokers can't fill customer
orders 'honestly and legally' without losing money" and that "brokers are almost expected
'to be able to work out any errors off the deck' of customer orders"); FBI Agent Says CME
Trader on Trial Claimed Open Outcry Not Working, Knight-Ridder Money Center News
14,995, Oct. 31, 1990 (reporting that trader claimed he needed to make off-market trades to
earn living).
78. See Testimony of James Nowak at 3393-4004, 3996-97, 4300-01, United States v.
Dempsey, 740 F. Supp. 1299 (N.D. Ill. 1990) [hereinafter Nowak Testimony].
79. See Nowak Testimony, supra note 78, at 4300-01, 4063-64, 4394, 4500; see also
Testimony of Bradley Ashman at 5574-75, United States v. Dempsey, 740 F. Supp. 1299 (N.D.
Ill. 1990) [hereinafter Ashman Testimony].
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can change before the order is executed. Nevertheless, it does provide a
clear competitive advantage, even greater than an edge, for a floor trader
and is intentionally designed to allow the execution of a customer order at
a price that is not competitive in the market place. The giving of a lead is
often done to repay a trader for prior errors suffered by the floor broker,
which were taken into the account of the floor trader and then later paid
back by leads.80
A third form of fraudulent trading practice exposed by the Chicago
sting operation involves so-called "matches." A match occurs when a floor
broker gives a buy order and a sale order to a floor trader at disparate
prices that provide a profit or a "scratch"-i.e., no profit-to the floor
trader. This is done without any exposure to the marketplace. These traders
often involve a third party who acts as an intermediary in order to conceal
the non-competitive nature of the trades.8' Matches often occur because
floor brokers are too busy to execute all the trades they hold in their
"deck. '8 2 Observing that trades can be matched off before or at the close
of trading, the floor broker may simply leave the orders in the deck until
market chaos diminishes and they can be matched off with each other in a
noncompetitive manner.8 3 This assures the floor broker of an execution and
allows him to build up his bank or pool with other traders so that he can
pay off errors that can not be concealed. A related form of fraud involves
trading against an order. This occurs when a floor broker takes the opposite
side of his customer's order by using an intermediary broker or brokers.
8 4
Another problem dramatized by the FBI sting operation are so-called
"curb" trades which are trades conducted after the close of trading. 5 Since
such trading is outside trading hours, it constitutes off-exchange trading in
violation of the Commodity Exchange Act. 6 Often such trading simply
involves floor brokers attempting to fill orders that were missed by mistake
or inadvertence during closing sessions, which are often chaotic. In other
80. See Nowak Testimony, supra note 78, at 3996-97, 4017, 4122, 4208; see also Ashman
Testimony, supra note 79, at 5754-71.
81. See Nowak Testimony, supra note 78, at 3393, 4004, 4076-78, 4085.
82. A "deck" is a reference to the outstanding customer orders held by a floor broker
on the floor. These orders are limit orders that are to be executed when the market reaches a
specified price. The floor broker keeps those limit orders in sequential order so that he can
quickly execute them if the market moves in a direction that will cause their execution. See
T. HIERONYMUS, supra note 7, at 53 (describing "deck" of customer orders); see also Burns,
Broker's Taped Lament to Agent: Honesty is Costly, Chicago Sun-Times, Nov. 15, 1990, at
58, col. 1.
83. See Nowak Testimony, supra note 78, at 4004; BROKERS AND BAGMEN, supra note
3, at 146-47.
84. See 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1988) (prohibiting trading off an order).
85. See Ashman Testimony, supra note 79, at 5501-02; Crawford, Defense Questions
U.S. Case in Merc Trader Trial, Chi. Tribune, Jan. 30, 1991, § 3, at 2, col. 5; Dishneau, 10
Convicted of Fraud in Commodities Case, Wash. Post, Jan. 10, 1991, at E3, col. 5; Burns,
Witness Tells of Pre-Arranged Trades, Chi. Sun-Times, Oct. 26, 1990.
86. See 7 U.S.C. § 6 (1988); 17 C.F.R. § 1.38 (1991).
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instances, curb trading is conducted, often long after the close, in order to
cheat customers.17
The trading practices revealed by the Chicago sting operation are not
new to the commodity futures industry-although their widespread nature
and their institutionalization on the exchanges does come as a shock. As
noted above, a case brought under the Grain Futures Act charged that
similar practices constituted manipulation. There was, however, no fraud
prohibition in the Grain Futures Act that could be used to attack such
practices.8" Accordingly, Congress enacted the Commodity Exchange Act in
order, among other things, to prohibit such "fictitious" sales, "wash
trades," "cross trades," and "accommodation trades."8 9 The Act also
prohibited brokers from taking the opposite side of customer orders without
their permission.9 Following adoption of that statute, the Commodity
Exchange Authority brought a limited number of cases against practices
similar to those exposed in the Chicago sting operation.9' Such cases,
however, were not a center piece of the agency's prosecutorial efforts.
Indeed, forceful criticism was directed at the Commodity Exchange Au-
thority during consideration of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Act of 1974 by the Inspector General of the Department of Agriculture
because there were insufficient efforts by the Commodity Exchange Au-
thority to determine whether trading was being done openly and competi-
tively in the trading pits. The Inspector General's review found " 'evidence
of direct and indirect bucketing of customer orders, accommodation trading,
excessive trading between brokers, executing customer and house account
orders for the same firm, and matching customer orders.' "92
The creation of the CFTC initially resulted in more aggressive prose-
cution of these trading practices. The CFTC particularly attacked wash
trading and other abuses that were done in connection with tax evasion
schemes that were widely carried out on the commodity futures markets. 93
87. For example, the government indictment in one of the Chicago sting operations
charged that "[diefendant-brokers and accommodating traders would arrange for the traders
to trade out of positions for themselves and brokers on the curb as long as one hour and
fifteen minutes after the close of the market." Indictment at 20, United States v. Dempsey,
704 F. Supp. 1299 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
88. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
89. See 7 U.S.C. § 6c (1988).
90. See 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1988).
91. E.g., Laiken v. United States Department of Agriculture, 345 F.2d 784 (2d Cir.
1965); In re Gerstenberg, 26 Agric. Dec. 816 (1967); In re Platt, 24 Agric. Dec. 93 (1965); In
re Ritten, 23 Agric. Dec. 747 (1964); In re Marks, 22 Agric. Dec. 761 (1963); In re Crilly, 20
Agric. Dec. 178, 180-181 (1961); In re Bojtek, 7 Agric. Dec. 386 (1948); In re Thomas Jordan
& Co., 7 Agric. Dec. 381 (1948); In re Goldwurm, 7 Agric. Dec. 265 (1948).
92. H.R. REp. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 46-47 (1974).
93. See In re Ratliff v. Commissioner, 865 F.2d 97 (6th Cir. 1989); Landreth v.
Commissioner, 859 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1988); Herrington v. Commissioner, 854 F.2d 755 (5th
Cir. 1988); Forsyth v. Commissioner, 847 F.2d 796 (7th Cir. 1988); Miller v. Commissioner,
836 F.2d 1274 (10th Cir. 1988); Kirchman v. Commissioner, 682 F.2d 1486 (lth Cir. 1986);
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The CFTC, however, as will be discussed below, ran into difficulty in
identifying whether particular trades were abusive and whether the trades
were done competitively. In fact, the CFTC recently issued four opinions
concerning tax trading practices that had occurred some ten or more years
ago in connection with those tax trading scandals. 94 Those decisions will
make prosecution of trading practices such as those exposed by the Chicago
sting operation even more difficult.
II. THE EXCHANGE MONOPOLY SHOULD BE ELIMINATED
The fraud revealed by the Chicago sting operation initially raised
widespread consternation in the press. 95 That concern diminished, however,
DeMartino v. Commissioner, 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,372 (2d Cir. 1988); United
States v. Winograd, 656 F.2d 279 (7th Cir. 1981); United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769 (2d
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077 (1981); Yosha v. Commissioner, 2 Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) 24,368 (7th Cir. 1980); Katz v. Commissioner, 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
24,255 (Tax Ct. 1988); In re Richardson Securities Inc. [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,842 (C.F.T.C. 1979), aff'd on other grounds, [1980-1982 Transfer
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,145 (C.F.T.C. 1981); In re Richardson Securities
Inc., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,810 (C.F.T.C. 1979); In
re Siegel Trading Co., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,452
(C.F.T.C. 1977); see also United States v. Atkins, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut.
L. Rep. (CCH) 23,706 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); In re O'Brien [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,512 (C.F.T.C. 1987); In re Grippo, [1987-1990 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,114 (C.F.T.C. 1986); In re Kuhlik, [1987-1990 Transfer
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,926 (C.F.T.C. 1986); In re Flynn, [1984-1986 Transfer
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,488 (C.F.T.C. 1985); In re Laspagnoletta, [1984-
1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,507 (C.F.T.C. 1984); In re Commodity
Exchange Inc., [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,443 (C.F.T.C.
1984); In re Sundheimer, [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,245
(C.F.T.C. 1981), aff'd sub nom. Sundheimer v. CFTC, 688 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 1022 (1983); In re Alfred Perlmutter, CFTC Doc. No. 79033 (Dec. 3, 1979);
Markham, Prohibited Floor Trading Activities Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 58
FORDHAM L. REy. 1, 22-29 (1989) (discussing tax trading abuses and criminal prosecutions
that arose from CFTC's efforts to attack those abuses).
The Internal Revenue Service conducted a broad scale effort to collect taxes from
individuals engaging in these abusive trading practices. See J. MARKHAM, supra note 7, at 84,
143, 153-56. One unfortunate individual the IRS targeted in that effort was singer Willie
Nelson. His tax straddle transactions resulted in a challenge by the Internal Revenue Service
and a subsequent forced sale of most of his assets. Mason, Mamma, Don't Let Your Babies
Grow Up to Work for the Tax Boys, Wall St. J., Jan. 29, 1991, at Cl, col. 3.
Mr. Nelson was not the only one affected by sham futures transactions conducted for tax
purposes. The chief executive officer of CBS, Laurence Tisch, and his brother, the former
Postmaster General, have filed a lawsuit as the result of the activities of an individual who
was convicted of creating over $1.3 billion in phony tax losses. Valeriano & Stevens, Tisch
Brothers Sue Asher Edelman Over Alleged Tax-Fraud Scheme, Wall St. J., July 23, 1991, at
B3, col. 4.
94. See In re Buckwalter, 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,995 (C.F.T.C. 1991); In
re Bear Stearns & Co., 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,994 (C.F.T.C. 1991); In re
Gilchrist, 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,993 (C.F.T.C. 1991); In re Rosenberg, 2 Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,992 (C.F.T.C. 1991).
95. See supra note 3.
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after an examination of the indictments revealed that, even though hundreds
of trades were involved, many of the dollar amounts for each trade were
small-often less than a few hundred dollars.6 Consequently, the total
amount of money involved was not great, at least as compared to some of
the financial scandals that have been observed in recent years in the securities
markets.9 7 The government also met an initial lack of success in its first
trial involving traders in the Swiss franc pit on the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange-i.e., convictions were obtained only on a limited number of
charges. 98 In addition, in a subsequent trial, the district court severed one
trader after the trial began because that trader's defense conflicted with
those of his fellow codefendants, raising concern that other traders there
would have a basis for appeal in the event of an adverse verdict. Interest-
ingly, the trader was severed because his defense was that the practices at
issue were so widespread that they could not be considered to be anything
other than normal practice.99 Those setbacks seemed to have been overcome
when the government obtained a number of convictions in its trial involving
the soybean pit.10° More recently, however, the Japanese yen pit trial resulted
in a severe setback for the government. The jury announced that it was
hung on many of the charges, and it acquitted some of the defendants.
96. See Agent Says CME Assisted FBI in Probe of Chicago Exchanges, Knight-Ridder
Money Center News 15,147, Nov. 1, 1990 (government witness testified as to trades in yen
pit, none of which resulted in losses of more than $400 to customers); Eichenwald, Business
and the Law; Commodities Charges Widen Use of Racketeering Statute, N.Y. Times, Aug. 7,
1989, at Dl, col. 1 (reporting that knowledgeable authorities viewed the charges as "compar-
atively minor crimes"). A few of the trades, however, were substantial, particularly at times
when market prices changed dramatically. See Crawford, Merc Trader Retraces Trail of Illegal
Yen Profits, Chi. Tribune, Jan. 8, 1991, § 3, at 1, col. 1 (describing two fraudulent transactions
that resulted in profits of over $320,000 cumulatively); Burns, Witness Tells of Pre-Arranged
Trades, Chi. Sun-Times, Oct. 26, 1990 (reporting on trader's testimony as to profit on one
trade of $9,000 that was done non-competitively).
97. See BROKERS AND BAGMEN, supra note 3, at 266. For example, Ivan Boesky agreed
to pay a fine of $100 million and was sentenced to jail for three years. Drexel Burnham
Lambert also agreed to a settlement with the government pursuant to which it paid a fine of
$650 million. R. SMITH, supra note 12, at 246-47. However, "[flewer than fifty Wall Streeters
have been convicted of serious securities law violations during the last decade." Id. at 282-83.
This should be compared with the 48 persons who were indicted in the Chicago sting operation,
over 30 of whom were convicted or pled guilty. See supra note 72.
98. McMurray, supra note 72, at R20, col. 1.
99. See United States v. Bailin, No. 89 CR 668, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14,569 (N.D.
Ill. Oct. 26, 1990); BROKERS AND BAGMEN, supra note 3, at 102, 105 (claiming that exchange
floor had its own unwritten code for the benefit of members). Defense counsel claimed that
the practices at issue in the Chicago sting involved a "custom and usage" that developed
"way before any of [the defendants] were ever out of diapers, much less when they got on
the floor." Bailin, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14,569 at *7. It was further claimed that "everyone,
including enforcement agencies, knew of the practices and did not do anything." Id. at *9.
See also Dishneau, 10 Convicted of Fraud in Commodities Case, Wash. Post., Jan. 10, 1991,
at E3, col. 5 (reporting that "[1]awyers for several of the defendants conceded they engaged
in curb trades and violated other rules, but they said the actions did not constitute fraud and
customers were not hurt").
100. See McMurray, Ten Soybean Futures Traders Convicted in Major Victory for U.S.
Fraud Inquiry, Wall St. J., Jan. 10, 1991, at C13, col. 1.
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Nevertheless, over thirty of the forty-eight traders indicted as a result of
the Chicago sting operation have been convicted. Retrials are also scheduled
for other defendants and more indictments are expected.' 0'
The press initially suggested that the problems exposed by the Chicago
sting operation could be corrected by prohibiting so-called "dual" trading
that now exists on the floors of the exchanges. Dual trading allows floor
brokers who are executing customer orders also to trade for their own
accounts.10 2 Another suggestion was that an improved audit trail would
permit detection of these practices and would provide deterrence to traders.
In fact, the CFTC has considered both of these issues for over fifteen years.
It has made some progress in improving audit trails, 1°0 and the CFTC and
Congress are now proposing restrictions on dual trading.""4 It is doubtful,
however, whether those efforts will effectively prevent the type of conduct
at issue in the Chicago sting operation because many of the practices at
issue in the operation did not involve dual trading. Further, the transactions
at issue were often accomplished shortly before or after the close of trading,
when timing is most difficult.
Considering the limited amount of money at issue and the mixed results
in the trials, one could pass off the Chicago sting operation as simply an
over-publicized aberration in the markets. That would be a serious mistake.
The testimony from those trials is evidence that the practices at issue are
not isolated.10 The Chicago trials provide strong evidence that the compet-
101. See supra note 73.
102. Markham, supra note 93, at 1.
103. Id. The CFTC appears to have acknowledged that the audit trail issue has been a
prolonged problem in the futures industry, noting that irregularities in trading documents
"have not been uncommon." In re Gilchrist, 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,993 at
37,652, n.22 (C.F.T.C. 1991).
104. See 55 Fed. Reg. 1047 (1990); Proposed Rile Concerning Restrictions on Dual
Trading by Floor Brokers, 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,803 (C.F.T.C. Apr. 10, 1990);
Block, Closer Oversight of Commodities Voted by House, Wall St. J., Mar. 6, 1991, at C6,
col. 6. The Federal Trade Commission has criticized the CFTC's efforts to curb dual trading.
See Comment to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission on Proposed Regulation 155.5
from the Staff of the Bureau of Economics of the Federal Trade Commission, 2 Comm. Fut.
L. Rep. (CCH) 24,885 (C.F.T.C. 1990). Nevertheless, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange is
imposing some dual trading restrictions. See Odd Lots, Wash. Post, Mar. 20, 1991 at CIO,
col. 3.
105. The CFTC and the exchanges have also brought additional cases charging abusive
trading. See In re Russo, No. 91-3 (C.F.T.C. filed Jan. 28, 1991); In re Bel, No. 90-29
(C.F.T.C. filed Sept. 25, 1990); In re Friedman, No. 90-14 (C.F.T.C. filed June 24, 1990);
Salwen, CFTC Charges Ex-Comex Official In Gold Trades, Wall St. J., May 16, 1991, at Cl,
col. 5 (reporting that seven traders were charged with fraudulent trading in gold futures);
Salwen, Futures Agency Settles Charges Against 3 Traders, Wall St. J., Mar. 13, 1991, at
CIO, col. 5; Chicago Merc Suspends and Fines Two $50,000, Wall St. J., Feb. 6, 1991, at
C13, col. 6; U.S. Accuses 5 Oil Traders, N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1991, at C4, col. 1; CFTC
News Release No. 3321-90 (Jan. 20, 1991) (describing settlement of charges involving non-
competitive trading by a floor broker); see also Marcus & Hagedorn, Commodity Brokerage
Firm Wins Suit Against Commodity Floor Broker, Wall St. J., May 24, 1991, at B8, col. 1
(describing jury finding that floor broker took opposite side of customer's order causing loss
of $159,000).
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itive environment upon which the present regulatory system is premised is
being undermined by the unhealthy relationship that has developed between
floor brokers and locals. Fundamental changes are needed. The futures
markets have enjoyed a statutory monopoly that has fostered and sheltered
the trading practices at issue. Until that monopoly is broken, or at least
weakened, any real reform in the futures markets will be frustrated.
1. Section 4 of the Commodity Exchange Act
Section 4 of the Commodity Exchange Act requires that contracts for
future delivery be traded on an exchange licensed as a "contract market"
by the CFFC.' °6 This licensing requirement has been the core of commodity
futures legislation since the enactment of the Grain Futures Act of 1922.107
The licensing requirement prevents the proliferation of unregulated off-
exchange futures contracts, and it assures that futures trading will be subject
to the regulatory restrictions imposed on traders on licensed commodity
exchanges. The concept of exchange-required trading also encompasses a
belief that such trading will offer greater benefits to hedging operations and
that it will assure more efficient price discovery because all orders will be
exposed to a centralized market place. 08 The downside to this requirement
is that it creates a monopoly position for licensed exchanges, with all the
attending abuses that can be expected from any monopoly. This undesirable
situation is compounded by the fact that the exchanges limit the number
of their members. That limitation results in special privileges and preferential
time and place access to the market. The monopoly benefits enjoyed by
these select few is reflected in the cost of exchange memberships, which
may cost several hundred thousand dollars. 09
An analogue to Section 4 may be found in the securities industry. Rule
390 of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) prohibits exchange members
from acting as dealers or crossing customer orders in stocks that are listed
106. 7 U.S.C. § 6 (1988).
107. See supra note 17.
108. For a discussion of hedging and price discovery, COMMODITY TRADING MANUAL,
supra note 1, at 11-19.
109. As one article notes:
The speculators on the futures-exchange floor can make split-second trading decisions
based on price changes before an individual has time to pick up a phone and call
a broker. Why else would these professional speculators be willing to pay several
hundred thousand dollars for what's literally a front row "seat," or membership on
an exchange?
McMurray, A Losing Proposition, Futures Trading Is Usually a No-Win Game For The Small
Investor, Wall St. J., Oct. 19, 1990, at R4, col 1. A Chicago Mercantile Exchange seat sold
for about $490,000 in June of 1990, but prices dropped to about $375,000 near year end.
Chicago Board of Trade seats have ranged in price from $315,000 to $325,000 during 1990.
Taylor, Futures Become Hot as the Economy Slumps, Sparing Chicago the Fate of Wall
Street, Wall St. J., Dec. 27, 1990, at Cl, col. 3; see also Dana, Changing of the Guard,
FUTURS AND OPTIONS WORLD, Jan. 1991 (including chart showing prices of Chicago Mercantile
Exchange seat ranging as high as $500,000).
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on the NYSE."0 This rule has been criticized as limiting market-maker
competition and as causing stock trading to be shifted to London. Some
have suggested that elimination of this rule would encourage the development
of proprietary electronic trading systems to compete with the NYSE. Pro-
ponents of the rule, however, argue that it prevents market fragmentation
that would reduce liquidity, and that it prevents brokerage firms from
internalizing customer orders. Such internalizing would result in not exposing
customer orders to all market participants."'
These arguments are similar in many respects to those offered in favor
of and against the continuation of Section 4 of the Commodity Exchange
Act. However, investors who wish to engage in off-exchange transactions
in listed NYSE stocks may do so through: (1) the "third market" of
nonmember over-the-counter dealers; (2) through the "fourth market" of
direct investor to investor trades conducted informally or through proprie-
tary electronic systems; (3) by executing transactions on regional exchanges;
110. Seligman, The Future of the National Market System, 10 J. CoRP. L. 79, 80, 116
(1984).
111. See U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, ELECTRONIC BuLus AND
BEARS, U.S. SEcuRrriEs MARKETS AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 11 (1990) [hereinafter ELEC-
TRoNc Buts AND BEARS]; see also The Shrinking of the Bid Board, Electronics, New Exchanges
and Off-Exchange Dealing are Challenging the Dominance of the New York Stock Exchange
and Baffling the SEC, ECONOMIST, Feb. 16, 1991 at 67 (reporting that one large brokerage
firm is now matching trades "in-house when they can, before passing them to the exchange
for form's sake"); Epstein, In Brief/Exchanges: The Big Board's Blues, How Competition Is
Draining Liquidity from the New York Stock Exchange, GLOBAL CUSTODIAN, Dec. 1990, at 32
(describing NYSE's attempt to interpret its Rule 390 to allow trading on foreign exchanges
only after close of trading and discussing other means utilized to avoid taking transactions to
floor of NYSE because of inefficiencies of NYSE's specialist system); Salwen, Bill Would
Divert Floor Trades Away From Independent Brokers, Wall St. J., May 15, 1991, at Cl, col.
5 (discussing proposed legislation that would cut execution costs for money margins on floor
of NYSE at expense of floor brokers on that exchange); Herman and Torres, Up All Night
Watching the War? Got an Urge to Trade?, Wall St. J., Jan. 22, 1991, at C1, col. 2 (discussing
third market transactions off NYSE); Norris, Phelan Leaves a Remolded Exchange, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 20, 1990, at DI, col. "4 (discussing efforts to broaden trading procedures at the
NYSE and improve automation to enhance competition on exchange without damaging specialist
interests and explaining that NYSE is seeing unprecedented outflow of business as traders
divert more and more trades to regional and electronic exchanges). The NYSE may also face
competition from a proposed electronic exchange that will create an auction style marketplace.
See Day, The Trials of a Traveling Regulator, Wash. Post, March 6, 1991, at C9, col. 2
(describing SEC approval of NYSE competitor's proposal that will create "an electronic trading
network-the so-called Wunsch system"); Wang, A Rock Climber's Reach for the Top on
Wall Street, Electronic Exchange Takes on Big Board, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1991, at DI, col.
4. The NYSE is seeking to bring trading back to its floor from London and from competing
trading systems. See Big Board v Small Screen, ECONOMIST, Apr. 6, 1991, at 12; Hinden,
NYSE Wins Vote For Longer Day, Wash. Post, May 21, 1991, at Dl, col. 5 (reporting that
NYSE extending trading hours to compete with competitors world-wide who trade stocks and
bonds twenty-four hours a day); Labaton, Late Stock Trades Approved by S.E.C., N.Y.
Times, May 21, 1991, at Al, col. 1 (same); Torres, Big Board Facing Serious Erosion as
Market for Stocks, Chief Warns, Wall St. J., Mar 13, 1991, at Cl, col. 5; Power, Big Board
Tries to Lure Program Trades from London, Wall St. J., Nov. 23, 1990, at C3, col. 3.
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(4) by trading in foreign markets such as London; or (5) by conducting
"block" trades on the exchange for large size orders, which may be
assembled or negotiated off-the-floor. These exceptions to Rule 390 effec-
tively allow large scale off-exchange trading. In fact, some 45 percent of
NYSE trades are being done as block trades. The NYSE has also adopted
a small order execution system that is designed to pair and process small
customer orders automatically-a system that is non-existent on commodity
exchanges. 12
The debate on the competitive restrictions of Rule 390, therefore, is
much more academic than that concerning the provisions of Section 4 of
the Commodity Exchange Act." 3 For the most part, Section 4 does not
contain similar exceptions. No third or fourth market is allowed to exist in
futures contracts and, as will be discussed below, block trading has been
prohibited. Efforts to create small order execution systems have also been
resisted by the exchanges." 4 Only foreign competition is permitted. Although
that competition has been virtually non-existent until recent years, foreign
futures exchanges are now becoming more competitive and are drawing
market share away from the United States."' This suggests that a need for
competition exists.
2. Competition from Other Financial Instruments Should be Permitted
The exchange monopoly requirement of Section 4 of the Commodity
Exchange Act raises other issues. The scope of its application is uncertain
112. See ELECTRONIC BULLS AND BEARS, supra note 111, at 8, 11; SEC STAFF REPORT,
THE OCTOBER 1987 MARKET BREAK 7-16, 7-21 (Feb. 11, 1988) [hereinafter OCT. 1987 MARKET
BREAK]. Today, the "third market" is limited in its volume. Labaton, Extra Time For Trades
Expected, N.Y. Times, May 20, 1991, at DI, col. 6. Moreover, "the NYSE specialists have
kept a government protected monopoly in market making. Arguably, the markets for listed
securities would have been more efficient than they were during the October 1987 debacle if
these markets had been more open to competition." Poser, Restructuring The Stock Markets:
A Critical Look at the SEC's National Market System, in ABA, SELECTED ARTCLES ON
FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW 10 (1991).
113. 7 U.S.C. § 6 (1988).
114. See infra note 161 and accompanying text.
115. See Platt, Foreign Competition Snapping at US' Heels, and Conflagration or Friendly
Rivalry?, J. COM., May 13, 1991, at 5A (reporting that world market share of Chicago Board
of Trade, largest U.S. futures market, slipped from 39% to 27.5% in last five years); Europe's
Futures In Options, ECONOMST, Mar. 16, 1991, at 79 (reporting that "American exchanges'
share of the global futures market fell from 70% in 1989 to 67% last year, and their share
in options from 66% to 59%"); Angrist, In Search of the "Hot" Futures Contract, Wall St.
J., Apr. 8, 1991, at Cl, col. 3 (stating that futures exchanges in United States "search for
new contracts, spurred by the hot breath of foreign competition"). Global trading of derivative
instruments is also expected to increase dramatically in the coming decade. See Sesit, Global
Sales of Securities Seen Growing, Wall St. J., Nov. 23, 1990, at Cl, col. 4. The United States
exchanges, howeVer, argue that this loss of market share is due to government regulations.
McMurray, New Plan to Tax Futures Traders Isn't a Sure Loser, Wall St. J., Feb. 7, 1991,
at Cl, col. 3; accord Simon, Foreign Investment Exodus Seen if U.S. Toughens Rules, J.
COM., Mar. 7, 1990, special report, at 7A, col. 3.
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and the breadth of its reach has resulted in the stifling of other commercial
markets. With regard to the former, the Commodity Exchange Act grants
the CFTC "exclusive" jurisdiction over futures contracts," 6 and Section 4
requires such contracts to be traded only on contract markets." 7 But the
Commodity Exchange Act nowhere defines what constitutes a futures con-
tract. Instead, the statute simply states that it terms do not apply to so-
called "deferred delivery" contracts."' These are merely forward contracts
used by commercial traders, rather than small speculators. This lack of
definition led to much confusion in the development in the 1980s of so-
called "hybrid" instruments such as swap contracts, interest rate floors and
ceilings and debt instruments that tied their returns to commodity indexes." 9
Reluctant to cede its exclusive jurisdiction, the CFTC has also taken an
expansive view of the scope of Section 4. This has caused much confusion
as to whether particular commercial transactions are permitted. Efforts by
the CFTC to alleviate that confusion have not been successful in that its
interpretations and "safe harbors" have, to date, been quite narrow.12 0 A
dramatic example of the deleterious effect of the contract market monopoly
in this context involves the Brent Oil market. Brent crude oil is a blend of
the production of a number of fields in the North Sea, with the system
terminal located in Sullom Voe, Scotland. The Brent market is truly an
116. 7 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1988).
117. 7 U.S.C. § 6 (1988).
118. 7 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1988). See generally Committee on Commodities Regulation of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, The Forward Contract Exclusion: An Analysis
of Off-Exchange Commodity-Based Instruments, 41 Bus. LAw. 853 (1986).
119. See generally Hu, Swaps, The Modern Process of Financial Innovation and the
Vulnerability of a Regulatory Paradigm, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 333 (1989); Gilberg, Regulation
of New Financial Instruments Under the Federal Securities and Commodities Laws, 39 VAND.
L. REV. 1599 (1986); Schroeder, Inadvertent Futures Contracts, 19 REv. oF SEC oF COM. REG.
89 (1986); Stein, The Exchange-Trading Requirement of the Commodity Exchange Act, 41
VMN. L. REv. 473 (1988).
120. See generally Markham, Regulation of Hybrid Instruments Under the Commodity
Exchange Act: A Call for Alternatives, 1990 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 1 (1990). The CFTC has
tried to apply mathematical formulas to determine whether a transaction has only de minimis
futures or options elements that would exclude it from the Commodity Exchange Act. See id.
The CFTC has also sought to include this methodology in pending legislation. However, one
Senator said that this approach "is like trying to put a mathematical definition on obscenity."
Block, Senate Panel Votes to Bolster CFTC Powers, Wall St. J., March 7, 1991, at C12, col.
5. The chairman of the Federal Reserve Board has further stated that this approach could
impair new financial products, including swaps. Greenspan Says Bill on Futures May Hurt
Financial Innovation, Wall St. J., Mar. 22, 1991, at C12, col. 6; see also Hinden, Futures
Rules, Headed For Vote in Senate, Wash. Post, Apr. 17, 1991, at Bl, col. 2; Labaton,
Compromise On Financial Regulation In Jeopardy, N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1991, at D20, col.
3. Nevertheless, the CFTC approach was adopted by the Senate. See Salwen, Senate Feels the
Impact of Marriage as Gramms Push Through Markets Bill, Wall St. J., Apr. 26, 1991, at
B4C, col. 1 (reporting that Senator Phil Gramm, his wife, who is CFTC Chair, and "politically
powerful Chicago futures exchanges" achieved Senate passage of this controversial provision);
Hinden, Senate Vote Gives CFTC Regulatory Victory, Wash. Post, Apr. 19, 1991, at Cl, col.
5; Salwen, Senate Passes Bill on Introducing Financial Products, Wall St. J., Apr. 19, 1991,
at Cl, col. 5.
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international market. In Transnor (Bermuda) Ltd. v. B.P. North American
Petroleum,'2 ' however, a U.S. district court held that transactions in the
Brent Oil Market are futures contracts that are subject to the Commodity
Exchange Act. The parties to the contracts at issue were a Bermuda
corporation plaintiff and defendant non-U.S. oil companies who had sold
oil to the plaintiff that was destined for delivery in Scotland. All of the
transactions were effected through London and were made expressly subject
to English law. Nevertheless, the court concluded that the contracts were
futures contracts under the Commodity Exchange Act because many other
participants in the market were U.S. based and two of the leading trading
centers in Brent Oil were in the United States.
This decision raised concern that the Brent Oil *Market would be
damaged and that U.S. traders would be excluded from that market. In
fact, many traders did move their operations offshore and refused to deal
with U.S. counterparties. The CFTC subsequently issued a statutory inter-
pretation which sought to assert that the district court decision in Transnor
was wrong and that the Brent Oil Market should be treated as a commercial
forward market that was not regulated under the Commodity Exchange
Act. 22 It is unclear how successful that effort will be, particularly since the
CFTC has rejected another judicial decision which held that transactions
between commercial traders were not subject to the Commodity Exchange
Act. 23 The Transnor decision also exposes the danger of granting the CFTC
exclusive jurisdiction-that there is no middle ground. The CFTC has no
power to grant an exemption. If the contract is subject to the Commodity
Exchange Act, it must be traded on a licensed contract market.124
The uncertainty created by Section 4 does not rest with the Brent Oil
Market. So-called "swap" transactions have proliferated to the extent that
they are themselves a major commercial enterprise. Uncertainty as to the
scope of Section 4, however, has given rise to concern that a court applying
a broad approach to Section 4 may declare these transactions to be illegal.
Swap dealers have attempted to obtain legislation that would exempt these
121. 738 F. Supp. 1472 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
122. See Statutory Interpretation Concerning Forward Transactions, 2 Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) 24,925 (C.F.T.C. Sept. 25, 1990); see also Bettelheim & Markham, The Transnor
Decision and Its Aftermath, 8 On. & GAS L. & TAX REv. 76 (1990). For a discussion of the
Brent Oil Market see Sass, The Legal Aspects of the 15-Day Brent Market, 5 J. ENERGY &
NAT. RESOURCEs L. 182 (1987).
123. See Krommenhoek v. A-Mark Precious Metals Inc., 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
24,952 (D. Idaho 1990). The CFTC asserted in Krommenhoek, as amicus curiae to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, that even commercial transactions are subject to the Commodity
Exchange Act. Brief of the CFTC, Amicus Curiae, Krommenhoek v. A-Mark Precious Metals,
2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,952 (D. Idaho 1990). Some hybrid offerings are going
forward. See Angrist, New Securities Tie Investors to Silver Prices, Wall St. J., May 20, 1991,
at Cl, col. 3.
124. See generally Bettelheim & Markham, More On Transnor, 8 OIL & GAS L. & TAx
REV. 223 (1991); Foley, Forwards vs. Futures, The Great Debate, FIA REVIEW, Mar./Apr.
1991, at 12.
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transactions, but, to date, they have been unsuccessful.2 5 The CFTC has
sought to allow these and some other hybrids to trade, but the approach it
has taken has been piecemeal and restrictive. For example, in order to
preserve its exclusive jurisdiction under Section 4 and to ward off SEC
incursions into its jurisdiction, the CFTC has discouraged development of
off-exchange bonds that were indexed to oil prices.126 The crisis with Iraq,
however, suggests that these could have been valuable investments.
1
125. See Over the Counier or On The Exchange?, EumoMOEY, Dec. 1990; Commodities:
How to Avoid the Pain, EuROMONEY, Dec. 1990 (describing commodity swaps); Young &
Stein, Swap Transactions Under The Commodity Exchange Act: Is Congressional Action
Needed? 76 GEo. L.J. 1917 (1988); Note, Oil-Price Swaps: Should These Innovative Financial
Instruments Be Subject to Regulation by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission or the
Securities and Exchange Commission?, 93 DICK. L. REv. 367 (1989). Legislation has been
proposed in Congress that would direct the CFTC to exempt swap agreements and certain
hybrid bank products from the provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act where such
transactions are subject to individual negotiations and are undertaken in connection with a
line of business. See Swaps Regulation Needed Despite CFTC's Collar Interpretation, SEC.
WK., Feb. 5, 1990, at 9. For a discussion of swap transactions, see Cosgrove, Commodity
Swaps Next Big Financial Investment?, J. Com., June 25, 1990 at Special Report, 9A, col. 1;
Hu, Swaps, The Modern Process of Financial Innovation and the Vulnerability of a Regulatory
Paradigm, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 333 (1989).
Uncertainty in swaps dealing has also arisen in Great Britain as the result of a ruling by
the House of Lords that restricts local government agencies' abilities to engage in such
transactions. See Corrigan, Lords Rule Rate Swaps Illegal, More Than 100 Local Authorities
Could Now Face Legal Action From Their Banks, Fin. Times, Jan. 25, 1991, § 1, at 18, col.
1; see also British Local-Authority Swaps, We're a Special Case, Old Chap, EcONOMST, May
11, 1991, at 74 (reporting that British government refuses to seek legislation to change decision
of House of Lords).
126. See Russ & Vinciguerra, Financial Innovation and Uncertain Regulation: Selected
Issues Regarding New Product Development, 69 TEx. L. REv. 1431 (1991) (stating that "[uintil
this statutorily required and increasingly meaningless dichotomy between futures and securities
is rejected as the touchstone for determining regulatory jurisdiction over new products, the
jurisdictional conflict and innovation-inhibiting trends that this conflict has engendered un-
doubtedly will persist"); see also Gilberg, supra note 119, at 1665-66; Commodities: How to
Avoid the Pain, EtnoMoNEY, Dec. 1990, special supplement, at 54 (explaining that CFTC's
jurisdiction created uncertainty and precluded development of markets for synthetic commod-
ities and commodity-linked bonds, although recent regulatory efforts by the CFTC have
allowed expansion).
Over-the-counter markets in derivative instruments are expected to grow rapidly abroad
in future years and to pose competition to futures trading abroad. The United States should
be allowed to have that same competition developed here. See Europe's Futures in Options,
ECONoOMIST, Mar. 16, 1991, at 79. Interestingly, the CFTC has permitted foreign governments
to trade hybrid instruments in the United States in the form of detachable warrants that are
tied to commodity prices even though it has not permitted such transactions for individuals in
the United States. Compare Order Authorizing Uruguay to Issue and Sell and Holders Thereof
to Resell, Units Consisting of Certain Detachable Rights, 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
25,008 (C.F.T.C. 1991) and Order Authorizing Mexico to Issue and Sell, and Holders Thereof
to Resell, Units Consisting of Certain Detachable Fights, 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
24,801 (C.F.T.C. 1990) with Interpretive Letter No. 85-4, [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm.-)
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,802 (C.F.T.C. Sept. 17, 1985) and CFTC's Letter No. 85-7, [1984-
1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,727 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 6, 1985).
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3. Section 4 and the CFTC "s Exclusive Jurisdiction Should be Modified
The need for the continued existence of Section 4 and the grant of
exclusive jurisdiction to the CFTC should be re-examined. When this pro-
vision was initially made the central part of the federal regulatory scheme
in 1922, and when it was carried forward in 1936, there was no effective
alternative regulation of off-exchange instruments. Efforts to regulate off-
exchange futures as gambling contracts had failed. The federal securities
laws were also in their infancy at the time of the adoption of the Commodity
Exchange Act. Consequently, Section 4 made good sense. Today, however,
the federal securities laws have maturecj on both the state and federal level.
Consequently, if off-exchange transactions are treated as securities, there is
assurance of effective alternative regulation. 27
Therefore, if a commercial transaction is subject to federal securities
laws, or if it is subject to an exemption under the federal securities laws,
such transactions should be freely permitted. For example, SEC Regulation
D permits limited offerings of unregistered securities to so-called "accred-
ited" investors who are large traders able to fend for themselves and who
do not need regulatory protection. 28 Similarly, if an offering of a hybrid
127. This is not to suggest that additional regulation may not be needed for off-exchange
instruments once they are freed from the exchange monopoly. Indeed, the limited market in
off-exchange instruments allowed by the CFTC may already need regulatory scrutiny. See
American Investment Banking: Beyond The Balance Sheet, ECONOMIST, May 11, 1991, at 74
(stating that off-balance sheet investments in derivatives by banks "expose banks to a potentially
huge credit risk if there are defaults"); Lohr, How B.C.C.L Accounts Won Stamp of Approval,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1991, at Al, col. 1 (reporting that Bank of Credit and Commerce
International concealed huge losses in financial futures and options); McCoy, Bad Bets: Many
Big S&L Losses Turn Out to be Due to a Financial Gamble, Wall St. J., Aug. 9, 1991, at
Al, col. 6 (discussing large losses by savings and loan institutions from exotic trading activities);
Torres, Bull Market for Derivatives Outruns Rules, Wall St. J., July 24, 1991, at C1, col. 3
(stating that $3 trillion derivative market has outgrown its regulators); Block, SEC Chief
Suggests Ending Coverage of Bank Derivative Securities by FDIC, Wall St. J., June 21, 1991,
at C2, col. 3 (reporting that failing bank's $30 billion in currency and interest rate hybrid
contracts proved costly to unwind, and that situation suggested that such off-balance sheet
instruments pose threat to global banking economy); Torres, Dangerous Deals: How Financial
Squeeze Was Narrowly Avoided in 'Derivatives' Trade, Wall St. J., June 18, 1991, at Al,
col. 6 (same); see also Hu, New Financial Products, the Modern Process of Financial
Innovation, and the Puzzle of Shareholder Welfare, 69 TEx. L. REV. 1273 (1991) (stating that
introduction of new hybrid financial instruments poses serious challenges to existing corporate
law framework). Credit risk problems in off-exchange instruments have also provided a
competitive opportunity for the commodity exchanges. See Taylor, Board of Trade Reaches
for Swaps Market, Wall St. J., June 20, 1991, at Cl, col. 3.
For a discussion of the scope and operation of the federal securities laws, see generally
T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION (1989); I-IX L. Loss & J. SELIGMAN, SECURITIES
REGULATION (3d ed. 1989-1991). The Clark Boardman publishing company has also established
a virtual library of treatises on federal securities regulation. See, e.g., H. BLOOMENTHAL,
INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES REGULATION (1990); R. HAFT & P. FAss,
INVESTMENT LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS (1990); D. LIPTON, BROKER-DEALER REGULATION (1990); J.
LONG, BLUE SKY LAWS (1990).
128. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501-.506 (1986); see also 7A J. HICKS, EXEMPTED TRANSACTIONS
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security is to be made to the public, and if it is registered under the federal
securities laws, it should be permitted, notwithstanding the restrictions of
Section 4. The federal securities laws provide full and adequate protection
to investors in the form of disclosures and in rights and remedies where
fraud is committed. 29 This approach would assure that commercial trans-
actions and public investments are allowed without undue restriction and
would allow less fettered development of new contracts. The competition
that would be provided to the futures exchanges could also do much to
eliminate the abuses that occur under the existing exchange monopoly.
Market users who are dissatisfied with paying for the monopoly practices
of exchange franchisees-exchange members-, or of the abuses uncovered
by the Chicago sting, could seek a market alternative.
The argument against this approach is, of course, that the elimination
or restriction of Section 4 can undercut the commodity exchanges because
they will no longer be the statutory central marketplace. Price discovery-
an important feature of commodity futures trading-, market liquidity and
other beneficial aspects of futures trading may be reduced. However, if
commercial markets or speculative investments occur outside of the ex-
changes, this would simply underscore the fact that there is a competitive
need for such services. If the exchanges no longer serve their price discovery
function, then that is a competitive decision that is being made by market
participants because they find other investments to be more desirable or
competitive. Moreover, competition should make the exchanges more effi-
cient and effective, rather than less so. Indeed, competition could assure
that the exchanges remain innovative by creating new, more attractive futures
contracts and that their marketplaces remain free of fraud and achieve
maximum efficiency in the execution of customer orders. 30 It would also
seem out of place for the exchanges, who bill themselves as the last bastions
of free competition, to claim that they should continue to be given a
regulatory monopoly over commodity-based transactions. 3 '
UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933, ch. 7 (1987); III L. Loss & J. SELIGMAN, supra note
127, at 1389-1450; Campbell, The Plight of Small Issuers (And Others) Under Regulation D:
Those Nagging Problems That Need Attention, 74 Ky. L.J. 127 (1985).
129. For a discussion of the registration and prospectus requirements of the federal
securities laws, see 1-lb H. BLOOMENTHAL, GOING PUBLIC AND THE PUBLIC CORPORATION
(1990).
130. A similar conclusion was reached by an industry advisory committee to the CFTC
in 1976. The committee considered whether the proliferation of futures contracts should be a
matter of regulation by the CFTC. The advisory committee stated that "[p]roliferation of
contracts should not concern the Commission. Market users should be left free to decide which
contract to use when more than one is available. The stimulus of inter-exchange competition
can lead to better contracts." Report of the CFTC Advisory Committee on the Economic
Role of Contract Markets, [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,187
at 21,065 (July 19, 1976) (footnote omitted).
131. See Laing, U.S. Study of Soybean Trading is Seen Leading to Tax-Law, Other
Indictments, Wall St. J., Aug. 9, 1976, at 18, col. 2. The motto of one exchange and the
trading jackets of one Chicago Mercantile Exchange member firm also claimed that the futures
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In order to implement this needed reform, the Commodity Exchange
Act should be amended by including a provision in the statute which would
state that Section 4 does not apply to transactions that are subject to
regulation under the federal securities laws. A less desirable alternative
would be to give the CFTC exemptive powers for a particular transaction.
This would be less desirable simply because the CFTC would be inclined to
continue the preservation of its jurisdiction by imposing unduly restrictive
requirements on exempted transactions or by simply denying the exemp-
tion.13 2
4. Self-Regulation
Coupled with the exchange trading requirement of Section 4 is the
concept of self-regulation pursuant to which the rules and directives of the
exchanges, in large measure, establish the regulation of commodity futures
trading. This is because the CFTC, and its predecessor the CEA, have
traditionally deferred to the exchanges' rulemaking and other self-regulatory
activities. Although exercising an oversight role, the government has only
rarely sought to exercise its powers affirmatively. This deference has con-
tinued despite the fact that there were numerous self-regulatory failures
markets were "free markets for free men." McMurray, Sandner Regains Merc Chairmanship,
Defecting Rival Linked to Melamed, Wall St. J., Jan. 17, 1991, at C8, col. 5; accord
McMurray, A Losing Proposition, Futures Trading is Usually a No Win Game for the Small
Investor, Wall St. J., Oct. 19, 1990, at R4, col. 1.
The exchanges, however, are unabashed in their view that loosening the requirements of
section 4 constitute "an assault on their business franchises." Gold, A Tale of Two Cities,
The New York and Chicago Exchanges Battle for Control of Stock Futures Trading, FN.
WORLD, Oct. 16, 1990, at 42. Clearly, the commodity futures exchanges have also used the
provisions of Section 4 and the competitive monopoly that it gives them to delay and prevent
the expansion of competing instruments. See, e.g., Board of Trade v. SEC, 923 F.2d 1270
(7th Cir. 1991); Chicago Mercantile Exchange v. SEC, 883 F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1989); Chicago
Board of Trade v. SEC, 677 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir.), vacated as moot, 459 U.S. 1026 (1982).
For a discussion of commodity exchange efforts to stop competition by utilizing regulatory
barriers, see Eichenwald, Marketplace: What Constitutes an "Exchange"?, N.Y. Times, Feb.
8, 1991, at D6, col. 3. In fact, competition among the exchanges seems to be lessening as
they consider joint operations and mergers. See BROKERS AND BAGMEN, supra note 3, at 77,
122; Chicago Exchanges Unlikely to Merge, J. COM., Nov. 28, 1990 (discussing efforts by the
Chicago exchanges to enter into joint ventures); Simon, Exchange Rivalries Fading, J. Com.,
Oct. 10, 1990, Special Report at llA, col. 3; Will Chicago's "Wall" Come Down?, FUrURES
& OPTIONS WORLD, Oct. 1990 (discussing possible joint operations of Chicago Board of Trade
and Chicago Mercantile Exchange).
132. Another alternative is to consolidate the jurisdiction of the CFTC and the SEC. See
Russo & Vinciguerra, supra note 126. The securities industries continue to seek to develop
new products that will compete with futures contracts. Amex Proposes to Resurrect Equity
Index Participations, INVEsTMENT DEALERS DIG., Dec. 10, 1990. Provisions that would lessen
the exclusive jurisdiction of the CFTC were proposed in Congress, but were defeated. See
supra note 120. Nevertheless, the SEC continues to take an approach opposite that of the
CFTC. The SEC has been approving nonexchange products that can compete with the regulated
securities exchanges. See Board of Trade v. SEC, 923 F.2d 1270 (7th Cir. 1991); Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 25,708, 54 Fed. Reg. 15,429 (1989).
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during the tenure of the CEA. Those failures were well documented in 1974
when the CFTC was created, but the CFTC continued to defer to the
exchanges, and it continues to do so despite continued self-regulatory
lapses.'33
Because of this deference and the exchanges' statutory monopoly po-
sition, the exchanges have amassed a most powerful position. The exchanges
seem to have a stranglehold over legislation that affects them through their
political influence on the agricultural committees, which control the CFTC,
and through other members of Congress. Large amounts of funds are spent
by exchanges in lobbying efforts and propaganda to frustrate legislative
reform. 3 4 Campaign contributions have, on at least one occasion, intruded
133. For example, the CFTC took no action during two of the largest crises facing the
futures markets-the silver crisis of 1980 and the Stock Market Crash of 1987. See Markham,
supra note 9, at 343-50; see also H.R. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 38-39, 48 (1974);
S. Rep. No. 1131, 93d Cong. 2d Sess.; Hearings Before the House Subcommittee on Special
Small Business Problems With the Permanent Select Committee on Small Business on Problems
Involved in the Marketing of Grain and Other Commodities, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 113 (1973)
(memorializing statement that exchange regulation is like "putting the fox in charge of the
henhouse"); Markham & Schobel, Self-Regulation Under the Commodity Exchange Act-Can
the CFTC Make It Work?, Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) Special Supp. No. 368 (Sept. 1, 1976).
The CFTC has been viewed as "nearly always [being] defensive of the industry it
regulates." EL~cTRoNic Buuis AND Bamis, supra note 111, at 83; see also BRoKERS AND
BAGMEN, supra note 3, at 157 (describing CFTC as a 'puppydog' regulator" that is "under-
funded and inept"). For example, the CFTC approved a proposal by the exchanges that allows
brokers to retain profits from out-trades with customers. Letter from Jean Q. Webb, Secretary
of the CFrC, to Mary Irwin, Director, Legal and Regulatory Division of the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange (August 24, 1991). An out-trade occurs where the trade did not clear properly
overnight because of an input error or omission. Such out-trades were used in some of the
fraudulent schemes uncovered by the Chicago sting operation. Previously, all profits from
errors went to customers, with brokers absorbing any losses. By approving this proposal, the
CFTC may have provided a further incentive to engage in "error" transactions. See CFTC to
Sanction Out Trade Profits For Brokers, Wall St. Letter, Jan. 21, 1991.
134. It was recently reported that the two Chicago futures exchanges were the leading
sponsors of privately funded trips for House members in 1989 and 1990. See What's News,
Wall St. J., Sept. 13, 1991, at Al, col. 3; see also CBT Clearing Corp. Will "Acquiesce" to
Misdemeanor Charges, SEC. WK., Sept. 24, 1984, at 8; Hinden, Lobbying Efforts Stop New
Rules on Futures, Wash. Post, Oct. 25, 1990, at El (reporting that "powerful futures and
agricultural lobby" successfully stopped efforts to impose restrictions on futures markets);
Atlas, Bush Urges SEC Rule of Futures, Chi. Tribune, May 9, 1990, § 3, at 1, col. 6 (discussing
lobbying efforts by exchanges in opposition to Administration proposals that followed in wake
of Stock Market Crash of 1987); Gaines, Right to Regulate at Stake, CBOT Says, Chi.
Tribune, Feb. 24, 1989, § 3, at 3, col. 5 (reporting exchange announcement, after being
criticized by CFTC, that its executives will lobby to assure that "member committees who
understand the delicacy of the matters will regulate and not bureaucrats with little or no
understanding of futures markets"); Knight, Commodity Sting Focuses on Flaws In Futures
Trading, Wash. Post, Jan. 29, 1989, at Al, col. 1 (reporting that one exchange contributed
almost $1 million to congressional campaigns between 1983 and 1989 and paid Congressmen
honoraria); Atlas, Urgency for Congress to Act Fades As Market Stabilizes, Chi. Tribune,
Oct. 16, 1988, § 7, at 2, col. 2 (reporting that one exchange had a political campaign chest
of $1.5 million and that contributions of $500,000 were made to exchange's political action
committee in a period of ten weeks after the Stock Market Crash of 1987); Povich & Jouzaitis,
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into the criminal area. 35 Numerous suits and public opposition to CFTC
rules by the exchanges have been used to prevent or obstruct CFTC
regulation. 36 Although the exchanges did lose in their effort to prevent the
creation of the CFTC in 1974, they have since effectively captured that
agency. Only rarely has the CFTC ever acted in a market emergency and
today it has virtually conceded that it will not do so. Rather, it will simply
defer to the exchanges to undertake whatever action the exchanges think
appropriate no matter how far reaching or threatening a market emergency
(as was the case with the Stock Market Crash of 1987).
Cures From Capital Hill, Chi. Tribune, Nov. 8, 1987, § 7, at 1, col. 3 (explaining that
exchanges have headed off legislation in past and that they contribute large amounts of money
for congressional campaigns); Cohen, Shootout on the 'Audit Trail', Chi. Tribune, Mar. 2,
1986, § 7, at 3, col. 2 (exchanges seek to block CFTC efforts to improve audit trail and that
two Chicago exchanges have political actions committees with total of almost $1 million in
funds); Cohen, New Trading Rule Draws Heat: Futures Exchanges Ask Congress to Intervene,
Chi. Tribune, Feb. 20, 1986, § 3, at 3, col. 1 (stating that exchanges are known for "effective
lobbying"); Agency Set to Push for Down-to-the-minute Futures Records, Chi. Tribune, Jan.
19, 1986, Business Section, at 6, zone S (reporting that one exchange established $1 million
"legal defense fund" to fight CFTC efforts to tighten audit-trails on exchanges); Cohen, Once-
Meek Futures Agency Now Busy Stepping on Toes, Chi. Tribune, Jan. 5, 1986, § 7, at 1,
col. 4 (reporting that exchange handed out buttons to be worn by its members stating
"endangered species? Ask the CFTC," and that exchange started campaign to increase political
contributions); Hines, Costly Silver Spoons: CBOT, Merc Pay Senators $46,000, Chi. Sun-
Times, May 25, 1984 (two Chicago exchanges are among top ten contributors of "honoraria"
to Senators). For a more complete discussion of the political activities of the Chicago exchanges,
see BROKERS AND BAGMEN, supra note 3, at 5, 122, 149-54.
The exchanges' lobbying efforts continue to be successful in curbing legislation that would
affect the futures markets. The head of one exchange boasted that he traveled to Washington
to lobby Congress over 100 times following the Stock Market Crash of 1987 in a successful
effort to curb legislation. Merrion, Donovan's Future, CBT's Skillful Boss Emerges as a
Leader, Crane's Chi. Bus., No. 17, Mar. 11, 1991, at 1, col. 3.
135. See CBT Clearing Corp. Will "Acquiesce" to Misdemeanor Charges, SEC. WK.,
Sept. 24, 1984, at 8; Cohen, Test is Clear For Clearing Corp. Chief, Chi. Tribune, May 13,
1985, § 7, at 13, col. 1; Leighty, Futures-Campaign, Associated Press A.M. Cycle, Nexis,
Sept. 13, 1984.
136. See, e.g., Board of Trade v. CFTC, 704 F.2d 929 (7th Cir. 1983); CFTC v. Board
of Trade, 701 F.2d 653 (7th Cir. 1983); Board of Trade v. CFTC, 627 F.2d 392 (D.C. Cir.
1980); Board of Trade v. CFTC, 605 F.2d 1016 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 928
(1980); Board of Trade v. CFTC [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
22,083 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Commodity Exch. Inc. v. CFTC, [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,445 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Board of Trade Clearing Corp. v. United
States, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,534 (D.D.C. 1978);
Board of Trade Clearing Corp. v. United States, [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) 20,246 (D.D.C. 1976); see also Markham, supra note 9.
Most recently, the commodity exchanges in New York exposed an FBI sting operation
and prevented the FBI agents from carrying out their operations. See Power, Commodity
Exchanges Unmask FBI 'Traders', Wall St. J., Mar. 27, 1991, at Cl, col. 3; see also Simon,
Aborted FBI 'Sting' Operation in NY Rattles Exchanges, J. Com., March 28, 1991. This led
to an investigation to determine whether exchange officials were guilty of obstruction ofjustice. Cohen, Angrist & Salwen, U.S. Probes Comex Aides Over Uncovering of FBI Sting,
Wall St. J., Apr. 19, 1991, at C1, col. 3.
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The concept of self-regulation has an analogue in the securities industry.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 establishes a "federally mandated duty
of self-policing by exchanges," accompanied by the regulatory oversight of
the Securities and Exchange Commission. 137 The oversight role employed by
the SEC, however, has been much stronger than that taken by the CFTC
under the Commodity Exchange Act. In the words of the late Supreme
Court Justice, William 0. Douglas, a former chairman of the SEC, self-
regulation in the securities industry envisions that, while the exchanges will
take a leadership role, the "[g]overnment will keep the shotgun, so to
speak, behind the door, loaded, well oiled, cleaned, ready for use but with
the hope it would never have to be used."'3 An attitude also prevails in
the securities industry that regulation is both appropriate and necessary. As
Donald Regan, the head of Merrill Lynch and later Secretary of the
Treasury, testified some years ago, "there is a need for regulation in our
industry, human beings being what they are.... [i]t has brought prosperity
to our industry, the fact that we are regulated, that the investor feels that
in going to Wall Street, they are not necessarily going into a den of iniquity
or a place of thieves."' 13 9
Yet, even in the securities industry there are concerns of conflicts of
interest and that the exchanges will use their self-regulatory role to limit
competition. The Supreme Court has noted that the concept of self-regu-
lation embodied in the federal securities laws "contemplates that the ex-
change will engage in constraints of trades which might well be unreasonable
absent sanctions of the Securities Exchange Act."' 4 Nevertheless, the se-
curities exchanges and the securities industry have played a much more
forceful role than the commodity exchanges in regulating their respective
industries. More importantly, the securities self-regulators have not engaged
in the same obstructionist role that the exchanges have played in the
commodity futures industry. To the contrary, the securities industry has
stepped up its enforcement and surveillance systems and has served as an
effective appendage to the SEC enforcement efforts.'4'
137. Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 352 (1963).
138., W. DouGLAs, DEMOCRACY IN FiNANCE 82 (Allen ed. 1940).
139. Securities Industry Study, Hearing Before the Senate Subcommittee on Securities for
the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 26
(1972).
140. Silver, 373 U.S. at 352. Moreover, as Adam Smith noted over two hundred years
ago:
People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion,
but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public .... [Though the law
cannot hinder people of the same trade from sometimes assembling together, it ought
to do nothing to facilitate such assemblies, much less to render them necessary.
A. SmrrH, THE WEALTH OF NATiONS 128 (W. Cannan ed. 1937).
141. There have, however, been self-regulatory breakdowns on the securities exchanges.
In 1963, for example, the SEC found there had been a complete breakdown of self-regulatory
standards and controls on the American Stock Exch. Report of Special Study of Securities
Markets of the SEC, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 751 (1963) [hereinafter
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Unfortunately, the commodity exchanges have not always proceeded in
the same enlightened manner. For example, the existence of perceived
conflicts of interest has resulted in charges and counter charges whenever a
market emergency erupts. To illustrate, it was charged in 1979 that a small
number of traders on the Chicago Board of Trade had amassed a control
position in the March 1979 wheat futures contract. The CFTC declared an
emergency in that contract but the CFTC's action was blocked temporarily,
but effectively, by the Chicago Board of Trade in a proceeding filed over
a weekend. 14 2 At the time of the CFTC's concern with these events, one of
the traders involved was a member of the Board of Governors of the
exchange and while he did not participate in the voting, he did attend the
meetings where the Board of Directors of the exchange considered which
actions it should take.' 43
Special Study]; see also, Gaines & Crawford, SEC Says CBOE Ignored Suspect Trades, Three
Exchange Execs Took Part in Bid to Increase New-Product Volume, Chi. Tribune, May 1,
1989, § 7, at 1, col. 4 (reporting that prearranged trading designed to inflate volume figures
engaged in on Chicago Board Options Exchange). Nevertheless, the SEC has recognized that
regulation "in the field of securities should continue to be based on the principle of giving
maximum scope to self-regulation, wherever to the extent that a regulatory need could be
satisfactorily met through self-regulation." Special Study, supra, at 726. Congress also has
stated that "the self-regulatory roles of the exchanges and the NASD have been major elements
of the regulatory scheme of the Exchange Act since 1934 and 1938 .... [T]he committee
believes it should be preserved and strengthened." S. REP. No. 75, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 201
(1975). For a discussion of securities exchanges and NASD self-regulation, see generally Miller,
Self-Regulatory Organizations in the Securities Industry: Does Membership Have Its Privileges?,
19 SEc. REG. L.J. 3 (1991); Miller, Self-Regulation of the Securities Markets: A Critical
Examination, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 853 (1985).
142. See Board of Trade v. CFTC, 605 F.2d 1016 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
928 (1980); Markham, CFTC Emergency Powers, 12 REv. SEc. REG. 863 (1979).
143. See CFTC Reauthorization, Hearings on H.R. 5447 Before the Subcommittee on
Conservation, Credit and Rural Development of the House Committee on Agriculture, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 717-722 (1982); March Wheat Futures Trading on the Chicago Board of Trade,
Hearing Before the Subcommmittee on Conservation and Credit of the House Committee on
Agriculture, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1979). The Washington Post and other newspapers charged
that the Vice Chairman of the Chicago Board of Trade had sat in on policy-making discussions
by the exchange's board of directors when they considered what action should be taken with
respect to the wheat contract. The Vice Chairman did not participate in the discussions, but
he and one of his partners were two of the four persons controlling some ninety percent of
the March wheat contract. Knight, Wheat Probe Calls Witnesses, Wash. Post, Mar. 23, 1979,
at Fl, col. 3; see also BROIKERS AND BAOMFN, supra note 3, at 142. A bill approved by the
House of Representatives would prohibit members of the governing board and committees of
contract markets to vote on any rule in which the member or the member's firm had a direct
financial interest. See H.R. REP. No. 102-6, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1991).
Concerns with the decisionmaking processes of the exchanges and their effects on the
public continue. Recently, one exchange proposed to prohibit using grain grown outside the
United States to meet futures contract delivery requirements-a proposal that has foreign
policy implications. See Taylor, CBOT May Bar Grain Grown Outside the U.S., Wall St. J.,
Apr. 15, 1991, at Cl, col. 6. It has also been suggested that the exchanges should act to stop
wrongdoing on their floors instead of heckling federal prosecutors after some of the sting
trials were unsuccessful. See Greising, A Hot Tip For Chicago's Exchanges: Clean House,
Bus. WK., Apr. 1, 1991 at 72. In the latter regard, a federal judge in Chicago found the
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Concerns with conflicts of interest often result in criticism of the
exchanges even when they purport to act in an enlightened manner. For
example, the CFTC faced a crisis in the soybean market in the summer of
1988, following a drought. A large foreign company had purchased soybean
futures contracts that were alleged to have exceeded the amounts of available
deliverable supplies in Chicago. Some members of the Chicago Board of
Trade expressed concern that the market was being manipulated. The CFTC
took no action, but the Chicago Board of Trade ordered the company to
engage in liquidation trading only. The company later charged that the
Chicago Board of Trade had acted in the self-interest of its members rather
than in its role as a self-regulatory body.44 Litigation on that issue continues.
The perception of conflict of interest on the part of the exchanges is a
real one. The exchanges are for the most part governed by their floor
members who are exposed to a welter of conflicts of interest. Moreover,
floor members are massed in a single location and, therefore, they have the
ability quickly to command initiatives and to remove from office those who
offend their interests. Floor members consisting of so-called "locals" and
'"independent" floor brokers also use their mass to control exchange ap-
pointments and policy. Indeed, candidates for the board of governors are
generally selected by their predecessors.1 45 In those instances where the
board's selections do not appear to have the floor interests in mind, the
floor members may select their own candidates by petition.'"6 As a conse-
conduct of one exchange to be "outrageous" after it expelled traders cooperating with the
government in the Chicago sting operation while allowing non-cooperating traders to continue
to trade. Futures Trader Mosky Receives a Sentence of Four Months in Prison, Wall St. J.,
July 17, 1991, at C16, col. 6.
144. See Markham, supra note 9, at 350-52; see also Ferruzzi Fails in Attempt to Halt
CBT Soybean Proceeding, 23 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. No. 34, Aug. 23, 1991, at 1278. The
exchanges also suffered criticism when they attempted to restrict the size of large speculators
on the silver markets during the silver crisis of 1980. It was charged that they were changing
the rules in the middle of the game. See INVESTIGATIVE REPORT OF THE CFTC DIVISION OF
TRADxINo AN MAsRKTS, TBn SILVER MARKET OF 1979/1980: AcnoNs OF TmH CIICAGO BOARD
OF TRADE AND Tan COMMODITY ExCHANGE, INC. (1985); see also Silver Prices and The
Adequacy of Federal Actions in The Marketplace, 1979-80, Hearings Before the Subcommittee
of the House Committee on Government Operations, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 281-83, 303 (1980).
In BROKERS AND BAGMEN, supra note 3, at 70, 148, the authors assert that a small
exchange in Chicago-the Mid-American Commodity Exchange-acted aggressively to enforce
its rules, to the extent that its attorney fees required it to merge with the Chicago Board of
Trade. The independence and aggression of that exchange may be due to the fact that its
management was completely restructured after the CFTC, in a rare moment of forceful action,
found that the exchange's management was riddled with conflicts of interest. Among other
things, the CFTC required outside directors to be added to the board, required a professional
staff to be hired and an affirmative rule enforcement program to be implemented. See In re
Mid-American Commodity Exch., Inc., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) 20,464 (C.F.T.C. 1977).
145. See CiCAGO BOARD OF TRADE, RULES AND REGULATIONS, §§ 100.00, 102.00, 156.00
[hereinafter CBT RurLs & REGs.].
146. Id. at § 102.00; see also McMurray, Sandner Regains Merc Chairmanship, Defeating
Rival Linked to Melamed, Wall St. J., Jan. 17, 1991, at C8, col. 5 (reporting that exchange
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quence, the public has only token representation in the form of outside
public directors on the exchanges' boards of directors. 147 In contrast, after
scandals on the securities exchanges, efforts were made to strengthen public
representation on those exchanges. Today, at least half of the boards of
directors of most securities exchanges are public directors who represent the
interests of the public rather than the exchange members. 48
member rode "wave of member discontent to regain the chairmanship of the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange").
147. The Chicago Board of Trade, for example, provides for four nonmember directors
who are nominated and approved by the Board and eighteen elected exchange members. CBT
RULES & RGS., supra note 145, at § 120.00. The Chicago Mercantile Exchange provides for
27 exchange members on its board and only five persons who are not members. RULEs oF THE
CHICAGO MERCANTILE EXCHANGE § 210.
148. Glickman & Russo, Business Forum: Commodity Exchanges and Self-Governance;
Look Beyond the 'Pit's' For Directors, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1984, § 3, at 3, col. 1. The
board of the NYSE, for example, is composed of twelve public members, twelve industry
members and two exchange officials. Big Board Nominates Two New Candidates, 10 Others
As Directors, Wall St. J., Mar. 12, 1991, at B5, col. 1.
The securities industry has long focused on the need to have independent representation
on boards of directors in companies that deal with the public in stock offerings or investments.
For example, the Investment Company Act of 1940 requires 4001o of an investment company's
board of directors to be composed of persons who are not "interested persons" of the
company. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10 (1988). Large stockholders are also attempting to expand outside
director representation in many publicly held corporations. See Barnard, Institutional Investors
and the New Corporate Governance, 69 N.C.L. Rv. 1135 (1991); Ferguson, Filling in the
Blankety-Blanks on Proxies, Wall St. J., June 25, 1991, at A23, col. 4; Lublin, Tense Times,
More Chief Executives Are Being Forced Out by Tougher Boards, Wall St. J., June 6, 1991,
at Al, col. 6; Stevenson, Battling For Shareholder Rights, N.Y. Times, June 6, 1991, at DI,
col. 3; Neff, Manager's Journal, Shareholder Muscle Cutting Into Corporate Fat, Wall St. J.,
Mar. 25, 1991, at A10, col. 3; Schellhardt, More Directors Are Recruited From Outside, Wall
St. J., Mar. 20, 1991, at B1, col. 6; but see White, New York's Regan to Pensions: Hands
Off, Wall St. J., Sept. 13, 1991, at Cl, col. 3 (reporting that trustee of large pension fund
does not believe that pension fund managers are qualified to interfere in corporate affairs
simply because they are large shareholders). In addition, a tentative draft of the American
Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance suggests that the board of directors of
every large publicly held corporation should have a majority of directors who have no significant
relationship with the company's senior executives and that large corporations should have
audit committees composed of directors who are not employed by the corporation. See
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CoRPoRATE GOVERNANCE, PART III §§ 3.03-.04
(Tent. Draft No. 2, 1984). This report also notes that the NYSE requires companies listed on
that exchange to have a minimum of two independent directors. See id. One former SEC
chairman would go even further and require that the boards of directors of public companies
be composed only of independent directors and the company's chief executive officer. See
Address of Harold Williams, Corporate Accountability, 5th Annual Securities Regulation
Institute, San Diego California (Jan. 18, 1978); see also Hahn & Manzoni, The Monitoring
Committee and Outside Directors' Evolving Duty of Care, 9 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 587 (1978).
Other commentators, however, have suggested that the board should include additional
company management. See Responsibilities of Corporate Officers and Directors Under Federal
Securities Laws, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. No. 1438, Part II at 18 (Mar. 15, 1991).
Smaller companies are increasingly using outside directors. Marsh, More Small Firms Are
Employing Outside Directors, Wall St. J., June 11, 1991, at B2, col. 3. Corporations with
outside directors also have a better ability to defend corporate actions when it is charged that
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In other instances where floor interests are not taken strictly into
account, the floor often acts virtually as a plebiscite by circulating petitions
on the floor and demanding that proposals be adopted by the board of
governors or that rules be changed or enacted to preserve their interests.
49
The result is that the interests of members are given primacy over the
interests of all others. The paramount interest of members, obviously, is to
protect their own financial interests.
The committee system employed by the commodity exchanges for their
administration is also in need of reform. Although the exchanges have
professional staffs, they are, in fact, governed by exchange committees
composed of exchange members. The exchange committees have overall
oversight in the board of directors or governors, 50 which, as noted are also
composed principally of exchange members. Exchange committees are often
riddled with conflicts of interest and by persons ill-equipped to manage the
affairs of an exchange. Those committees are responsible for enforcing
exchange rules and disciplining other members. However, because they do
not often have lawyers as members, their actions are often marked by due
process violations and the rules they enforce are often so broad or obscure
as to allow any conduct to be deemed offensive.' Committee members
there was self dealing by corporate officers or other breaches of fiduciary duty. See e.g.,
Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 295 (7th Cir. 1981); Solash v. Telex Corp.,
[1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 93,608 (Del. Ch. 1988); Revlon, Inc.
v. MacAndrew & Forbes Holdings Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. Super. Ct. 1986); Moran v.
Household Int'l, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. Super. Ct. 1985); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,
493 A.2d 946 (Del. Super. Ct. 1985). In any event, increased representation of the outside
directors in public companies seems to be a long term phenomenon. SEC STAFF REPORT ON
CORPORATE Accom NTmrry (Sept. 4, 1980).,
149. See BROKERS AND BAGMEN, supra note 3, at 119 (stating that Chicago Exchange is
operated for benefit of floor brokers); CBT RuLEs & RGs., supra note 145, at § 109.00;
Changing of the Guard, Ftrrus & OPTIONs WORLD, Jan. 1991 (contrasting Chicago Mercantile
Exchange which has "traditionally been a member-run organization" with NYSE which has a
broad array of interests represented on its board, including twelve public members).
150. The most important of these committees is generally referred to as the Business
Conduct Committee. It is responsible for disciplining members for violation of exchange rules.
See CBT RuLs & REGS., supra note 145, at § 542.00. The committee in next order of
importance is the Floor Conduct or Floor Governors Committee, which is responsible for
proposing rules for trading activities on the floor of the exchange and for administering the
conduct of members trading on the floor. See id. at § 543.00.
151. The CFTC has reversed numerous self-regulatory disciplinary actions for improper
procedures. See, e.g., Siegel v. Board of Trade, 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,983
(C.F.T.C. 1991) (holding that chairman of disciplinary committee improperly acted as prose-
cutor on appeal to Board of Governors, that there were gaps in record on appeal, that
improper inferences were drawn and that unreliable hearsay evidence was relied upon by
exchange); Laken v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,968
(C.F.T.C. 1990) (holding that respondent was not provided required discovery materials and
that prosecutorial and adjudicative roles of exchange members staff were improperly mixed);
ABC Commodity Futures Options Inc. v. National Futures Ass'n, 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) $24,911 (C.F.T.C. 1990) (holding that exchange had applied improper procedures);
Brotman v. Commodity Exch., Inc., 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,907 (C.F.T.C. 1990)
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also devote much time and effort to assure that their rules preserve the
value of their membership. To cite one example, the Chicago Board of
Trade does not allow registered professionals on its floor and sharply limits
the role of clerks on the floor who assist members. This is to assure that
the value of membership is not reduced by allowing nonmember profes-
sionals to have access to the floor. 5 2
5. More Public Representation is Needed
Representation on the futures exchanges should be modified so that
public members serve on disciplinary committees, on exchange committees
that propose regulations and on the governing bodies of the exchanges,
including the executive committee and board of governors. The election
process for the board of governors should also be changed to assure that
public directors are indeed independent on the floor. Control of exchange
committees should be placed in the hands of professional management at
the exchanges and greater oversight of their operations should be undertaken
by the CFTC to assure that self-regulation is working in the public interest,
and not solely in the interests of exchange members.
(holding that exchange used improper procedures in imposing disciplinary sanctions); Fusfield
v. Financial Instrument Exch., 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,906 (C.F.T.C. 1990) (finding
record before exchange disciplinary body to be materially misleading); Redel v. Coffee, Sugar
& Cocoa Exch., 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,897 (C.F.T.C. 1990) (reversing exchange
disciplinary decision proceeding for improper procedures); Mandelbaum v. New York Mercan-
tile Exch., 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,896 (C.F.T.C. 1990) (reversing exchange
disciplinary decision because of improper procedures); In re First Commodity Corp. of Boston,
2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,850 (C.F.T.C. 1990) (reversing exchange proceeding for
second time); In re Bryant, 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,847 (C.F.T.C. 1990) (affirming
registration denial after second appeal); In re Horn, 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,836
(C.F.T.C. 1990) (reversing for second time decision allowing industry leader to remain in
business after being convicted of felony); In re Lama, [1987-1990 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,294 (C.F.T.C. 1988) (finding error in exchange's failure to consider
relevant evidence); Laybov v. Chicago Board of Trade, [1987-1990 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,942 (C.F.T.C. 1987) (directing exchange to. reconsider penalty); In
re Horn, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,406 (C.F.T.C. 1986)
(reversing decision allowing registration of convicted felon who had been former industry
leader); Grabarnick v. National Futures Ass'n, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) 23,270-72 (C.F.T.C. 1986) (finding that exchange had failed to explain decision);
In re Morrissey, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,961 (C.F.T.C.
1986) (holding that suspension imposed by exchange was not reasonable); In re Missouri
Farmers Ass'n, [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,310 (C.F.T.C.
1984) (holding that policy applied by exchange had not been properly adopted, but also that
it was moot on other grounds); In re Spilatro (C.F.T.C.), noted in Seifert, Commission to
Review Exchange Actions, 9th Annual Commodities Law Institute, Sept. 25-26, 1986 (holding
that exchange failed to specify reasons for denying membership to applicant). However, the
problem with fair procedures may not be limited to the commodity exchanges. See Lowenfels,
A Lack of Fair Procedures in the Administrative Process: Disciplinary Proceedings at the
Stock Exchanges and the NASD, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 375 (1979); but see Poser, Reply To
Lowenfels, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 402 (1979).
152. See Chicago Board of Trade Regulation 301.05 and app. 3B.
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A bill approved by the House of Representatives in 1989 would have
required that at least twenty percent of the members of exchange board of
governors be outside directors-i.e., public representatives who do not have
affiliations with the exchange.'53 This proposal falls well short of the goal
of removing control of the exchanges from the floor members. A more
effective approach would be to limit floor representation to twenty percent
and require at least fifty percent of the board members to be independent
or public directors. The remaining thirty percent would represent other
interests on the exchange such as the brokerage firms.
These proposals may seem mild, but any effective reform turns upon
their implementation. Such changes would shift political control of the
exchanges to a more public-minded group than the individual members who
are exposed to the temptation of enriching themselves at the expense of the
public. Public minded directors can devote the energies and resources of
the exchange to modernizing operations, and they can expend funds on
improving surveillance and enforcement mechanisms rather than supporting
lobbyists to frustrate needed legislative reforms or to carry out feuds with
the CFTC. To date, the exchanges have used their monopoly positions to
block needed reforms and regulation because their self-interest so dictates.
By transferring control to public directors, reform measures can be viewed
from the more objective viewpoint of the public interest, instead of simply
from that of monopoly preservation. 154
153. See H.R. REP. No. 236, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1989). One should not expect that
a requirement for independent directors will result in radical reformers being appointed to
exchange boards. The appointment of outside directors is controlled by management and they
will generally appoint individuals they believe are compatible with management views. See W.
CARY & M. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS-CAsES AND MATERIALS 969-70 (6th ed. 1988); M. MACE,
DIRECTORS: MYTH AND RALnrY (1971); Mace, The President and Board of Directors, HARv.
Bus. REv., Mar.-Apr. 1972, at 37; Monks, The Oxymoron in the Boardroom, N.Y. Times,
May 5, 1991, at F13, col. 4; see also Brudney, The Independent Director-Heavenly City or
Potemkin Village?, 95 HARv. L. REv. 597 (1982); see also Hazen, The Corporate Persona,
Contract (and Market) Failure, and Moral Values, 69 N.C.L. REv. 273, 283-84 (1991).
Nevertheless, mavericks do sometimes appear. See Bailey, Eagleton Accuses Chicago Merc's
Leaders and Quits, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1989, § 3, at 17, col. I (reporting on resignation of
outside director of commodity exchange and on director's charge that exchange's enforcement
policies were improper); Eagleton, Chicago's Markets: Corrupt To The Core, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 14, 1989, at A31, col. 2 (same); Vise, Eagleton Resigns Merc Post, Blasts Officials at
Exchange, Wash. Post, Nov. 8, 1989, at BI, col. 5 (same). Moreover, outside directors will
be at least one step removed from the pressures of the floor interests and they can add needed
objectivity and balance. See Bierrie, Don't Blame Program Trading-Blame the Market, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 6, 1989, at A30, col. 6 (discussing role of outside director on commodity
exchanges).
Indeed, even opponents of additional government regulation of the futures exchanges have
advocated broader representation on exchange boards. See Lower, Disruptions of the Futures
Market: A Comment on Dealing with Market Manipulation, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 391, 401
(1991); but see Outside Directors Tied to Skimpy Returns, Wall St. J., July 30, 1991, at BI,
col. 1 (suggesting that companies controlled by outside directors may have reduced profitability).
154. The best example of the exchanges' role in frustrating reform is the fifteen year
odyssey that the CFTC has undergone to strengthen audit trail requirements on the exchanges
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This proposal is critical but it faces a monumental hurdle that may be
referred to simply as the "franchise" problem. Exchange members presently
pay large amounts for their seats-often several hundred thousand dollars.
5
Individual floor members view this as a purchase of a franchise. Their
control of exchange governing bodies and committees all have one overriding
objective-the preservation of that franchise. Through control of the gov-
erning bodies of the exchanges these franchisees also seek to assure that the
public pays for the continuation of that franchise. For example, most
exchanges charge customers a transaction fee that is many times more than
the transaction fees paid by exchange members. 5 6 The ostensible basis for
and to impose regulations that would remove the appearance of conflict by dual trading of
floor brokers (traders who trade both for their own account and for customers). See BROKERS
AND BAGMEN, supra note 3, at 135-36, 150-51; Markham, supra note 93.
155. Efforts to increase representation of outside directors on commodity exchange boards
of directors can be expected to meet strong opposition. See Letter to the Editor, Commodity
Governance, N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1984, § 3, at 12, col. 1 (wherein exchange member objects
strongly to proposal to increase public directors on commodity exchanges). The attitude
expressed by one defendant in the Chicago sting operation is revealing. He stated, "[Expletive]
the customers .... We should have the advantage. That's why we have the membership ....
Let them buy a [expletive] seat for $500,000 and put their money on the line like the rest of
us." McMurray, A Losing Proposition, Futures Trading is Usually a No-Win Game for the
Small Investor, Wall St. J., Oct. 19, 1990, at R4, col. 1. According to the testimony in one
of the Chicago sting operation trials, traders are willing to pay several hundred thousand
dollars for a seat on the Chicago board of Trade so that they can enjoy the "edge." Novak
Testimony, supra note 78, at 4300-01.
For a discussion of efforts by the commodity futures exchanges to protect their "fran-
chises," see Gold, A Tale of Two Cities, The New York and Chicago Exchanges Battle for
Control of Stock Futures Trading, FIN. WORLD, Oct. 16, 1990, at 42; Eichenwald, Marketplace:
What Constitutes An "Exchange"?, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1991, at D6, col. 3. The commodity
exchanges' efforts to preserve the franchise have resulted in a stalemate for legislative reform
while "[t]he public sits in the middle" and while "important reforms [are] being killed in the
cross-fire." A Reform That Failed, Wash. Post, Oct. 29, 1990, at A14, col. 1.
156. See Chicago Board of Trade Rule 450.02 (charging two cent per side transaction fee
for exchange member transactions and 50 cents per side transaction fee for nonmembers).
Recently, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange announced that it would reduce its twenty-five
cent per transaction charge for members to seven cents. Taylor, Chicago Merc Sets Reduction
in Fees on Futures Trades, Wall St. J., Jan. 8, 1991, at C15, col. 1. It will reduce the charge
to public customers to seventy cents from seventy-five cents. Id. Some members on the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange had wanted even a bigger cut in member fees. Chicago Merc's Members
Reject Traders' Fee Plan, Wall St. J., Jan. 25, 1991, at C12, col. 4. In contrast, the exchanges
have vigorously fought any effort to impose a service fee that could be used to help pay for
regulatory costs. See J. MARKHAM, supra note 7, at 110; Horwitz & Markham, Sunset on the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission: Scene Two, 39 Bus. LAW. 67, 80-81 (1983);
McMurray, New Plan to Tax Futures Traders Isn't a Sure Loser, Wall St. J., Feb. 7, 1991,
at Cl, col. 3.
The CFTC has stated that it will not seek to regulate fees charged by the exchanges. See
Davis & Partners, Ltd. v. New York Futures Exch., 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,816
(C.F.T.C. 1990). In another context, the CFTC stated that it does not seek to regulate the
level of fees that a customer may agree to pay to commodity professionals even if they are
unconscionable or per se fraudulent. Johnson v. Fleck, 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,957
(C.F.T.C. 1990); accord Macurdy v. Byrne, 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 25,083 (C.F.T.C.
1991).
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justifying this disparity is the claim that exchange members need low
transaction fees so that they can more easily trade in high volume and add
liquidity to the market place. That is, indeed, true but it hardly justifies
imposing a disparate fee on the public for whom these markets are held
open and who also add liquidity. Its justification also overlooks the fact
that these exchange fees are used in large measure to perpetuate the
franchise, by lobbying against reform and frustrating the CFTC, to the
detriment of the public.
Elimination of the franchise would also bring the United States in line
with current reform efforts in Europe. In this regard, the European Com-
mission's draft investment service directive would require EC member states
to nullify any rules of exchanges that limit the number of persons admitted
to membership. Not surprisingly, the European exchanges have opposed
this on the grounds that they should have the right to control access to
their floors, which are limited in space. 1S7 The space problem is a constraint
particularly in the futures markets in their present form. But that should
not be used as a reason to perpetuate a monopoly. To the contrary, if the
franchise is eliminated, the exchanges will have an incentive to expend funds
on the expansion of facilities or to automate in a way that allows greater
participation, rather than to lobby against reform or engage in quarrels
with the CFTC. Greater access to the market place on equal terms by more
persons would also assure greater competition. To the extent facilities
become overtaxed, an incentive will exist for competing exchanges to develop
and provide even further competition.
Existing members will, of course, contend that disenfranchisement will
mean that their capital assets are being diminished and that this would be
an unfair taking of their property-property for which they paid several
hundred thousand dollars. However, the value of these memberships is
simply a reflection of their monopoly value-i.e., only a limited number of
such memberships are made available by the exchanges in exercising their
statutory monopoly under Section 4 of the Commodity Exchange Act.
Nevertheless, recognition should be given to the fact that many individual
members have literally expended their entire life's savings or incurred heavy
debts in order to obtain a seat. Those concerns could be diminished,
however, by extending the period over which additional memberships would
157. The proposed investment directive states that:
Host Member States shall ensure that investment firms which are authorized to
provide broking, dealing or market-making services in their home Member States
can enjoy the full range of trading privileges normally reserved to members of stock
exchanges and organized securities markets of host Member States where similar
services are provided.
Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on Investment Services in the Securities Field,
tit. 4, art. 10, 3, 1989 O.J. (C 43) 7, 10; see also Financial Services in Europe, Single, But
Not Level, EcoNoIsT, Feb. 23, 1991, at 83; French Stock Brokers, Nanny Picks Up The
Pieces, ECONOMIST, Jan. 12, 1991, at 73-74 (reporting that French brokers lost their monopoly
on exchange seats and foreign brokers will be given equal access to the French market).
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be sold at more affordable prices. This would allow an opportunity for
facilities to be expanded, and the prices paid for the existing franchises
could be amortized over the remaining life of the monopoly franchise.
Alternatively, the exchanges could use a portion of revenues from new seat
sales to pay prior membership holders as a recognition of the diminishment
of their value. At worst, such payments would be a small tribute to pay
for the reform that is needed. Whatever happens, continued restriction of
access to the market place should be eliminated or reduced to the maximum
extent possible.
III. FLOOR OPERATIONS NEED TO BE RESTRUCTURED
1. An Automated Small Order System is Needed
The commodity exchanges have long needed an automated small order
execution system. Indeed, several years ago, an official for a large brokerage
firm urged that an automated order system for small orders be developed
in the commodity futures industry because of customer dissatisfaction with
the chaotic order filling system on the exchanges. That proposal set off a
storm of controversy and it was never brought to fruition.58 The CFTC
158. See Merrill Commodities Chief Proposes Automated Executions, SEC. WK., Sept.
28, 1981, Financial Futures Commodity Report, at 8. The official later retreated somewhat
from this position, but still stressed the need for improved order handling. See Maidenberg,
Futures/Options; Automation and Trading, N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1984, at C4, col. 3;
Maidenberg, Futures/Options: Big Growth in Orders Paralyzing Trading Pits, N.Y. Times,
March 19, 1984, at D6, col. 3. The brokerage firm official sought to avoid controversy in
making this proposal by suggesting that floor brokers would still receive brokerage fees for
executions conducted through the black box. It was thought that this tribute, which would be
a payment for doing nothing, would be worth a more orderly order filling process. The
Chicago sting operation suggests that the floor brokers had more in mind than just floor
commissions when they opposed this proposal.
After the black box proposal was blocked, the brokerage firms began utilizing their own
employees as floor brokers to execute their customer orders. This too was met by a storm of
opposition on the exchanges because floor brokers were afraid that this would reduce the
value of their franchise. Maidenberg, Futures/Options; Rules Dispute Spread Feared, N.Y.
Times, June 11, 1984, at D2, col. 1.
Interestingly, a bill approved by a Senate committee would make brokerage firms second-
arily liable to their customers for damages caused by floor brokers on the exchange, even if
the floor brokers are not their own employees. Brokerage firms would also be liable for
punitive damages for the activities of such "independent" brokers if it were shown that the
brokerage firm intentionally selected a floor broker with the intent to assist or facilitate the
floor broker's violation. This appears to be simply an effort to find a deep pocket for the
fraudulent activities of undercapitalized floor brokers on exchanges. See S. RPP. No. 101,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1989); see also Rotter v. Stotler & Co., 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) 24,621 (C.F.T.C. 1991) (liability for activities of independent floor broker imposed
on brokerage firm); Buran v. Lerman, 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,874 (C.F.T.C.
1990) (holding brokerage firm liable for activities of independent floor broker); but see Balfour
Maclaine, Inc. v. National Coin Exch., 697 F. Supp. 835 (E.D. Pa. 1988); Johnson v. Chilcott,
658 F. Supp. 1213, 1218 (D. Colo. 1987); Fustok v. ContiCommodity Services, Inc., 618 F.
Supp. 1082, 1088 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Sherman v. Sokoloff, 570 F. Supp. 1266, 1270-71 (S.D.N.Y.
1983).
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also has not made any effort to urge the exchanges to develop an automated
small order execution system. Sadly, the effect of that failure is reflected
in the Chicago sting operation in that most of the orders involved there
were small in size. If a small order execution system had been in place at
the Chicago exchanges, much of the fraud exposed by the Chicago sting
would have been avoided. Those orders could have been executed auto-
matically and at competitive prices. Unfortunately, there is still no effort
underway to establish a small order execution system for commodity futures
orders of a small size. That shortcoming should be corrected.1 9
Presently, the stock exchanges and the NASD have automated order
execution systems for small customer orders. These include the Super DOT
system of the New York Stock Exchange and the SOES system of the
NASD. 6° New information technology is also being developed in the secu-
rities industry that would allow small orders to be automatically queued,
bids and offers matched, and trades executed. These systems will also allow
executed trades to be moved through final settlement and they would create
an audit trail. 6'
159. See Markham, There's Trouble in the Futures Trading Pits, Legal Times, June 3,
1991, at 26; see also BROKERS AN] BAGMEN, supra note 3, at 311-12 (suggesting that computers
be used to match retail customer orders). The problems exposed by the Chicago sting operation
and other inefficiencies in executing orders were well known even before the sting operation.
Indeed, it was charged that cheating of customers was institutionalized. See BROKERS AND
BAOMEN, supra note 3, at 71 (prior to public disclosure of sting operation, one federal judge,
somewhat intemperately, charged that one Chicago exchange was a "cesspool" where "sham"
trades were commonplace); Cohen & Jouzaitis, S&P Futures Pit Giving Merc Black Eye, Chi.
Tribune, Feb. 22, 1987, § 7, at 1, col. 2.
160. In the 1960s, the order execution process on the securities exchanges was similar to
the methodology used on commodity futures exchanges in that orders were transmitted to
brokerage firm desks on the floor of the NYSE and then hand carried for execution from the
desk to the specialist post. On commodity exchanges there is no specialist. There, orders are
transmitted to brokerage firm desks on the floor and then carried by "runners" or "flashed"
by hand signal to the pit for execution. This is a manually intensive process. The NYSE
developed its Designated Order Turnaround (DOT) system to allow small market orders to be
directly routed from the member firm's branch office to the applicable specialist post, thus
eliminating the necessity of transmitting the orders to a desk on the floor and manually
transmitting them to the specialist post. The NYSE enhanced this system in the 1980s by
allowing pre-opening orders to be paired off, leaving only the imbalance for execution by the
specialists. The NYSE also enhanced the system by allowing automatic routing of limit orders
to a limit order book. Thereafter, automated executions were permitted where the NYSE was
reporting the best quote. The specialist limit order book was also automated. Other exchanges
developed small order execution systems as well. See OCT. 1987 MAXET BREAK, supra note
112, at xxii, 7-16 to 7-38.
The NASD's Small Order Execution System (SOES) was designed to allow small orders
to be executed automatically at the best bid or ask price. A problem that developed with the
SOES system was that the market makers could withdraw at any time and re-enter without
limitation. During the Stock Market Crash of 1987 many market makers withdrew from the
system. NASD is now imposing minimal requirements to assure continued participation in the
system during market breaks. See id. at xxiv, 9-12 to 9-19.
161. See ELcTRONIC Bunzs AND BEARS, supra note 111, at 3. This is not to suggest that
the entire exchange process must be automated, because complete automation could impair
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It should be noted, however, that these automated systems may not be
a complete panacea. Automated order systems in the securities industry
have also proved faulty in high volume moments such as the Stock Market
Crash of 1987; although improvements are being made to assure better
performance.1 62 Automated order execution systems may also themselves be
subject to abuses and lack of regulation, as where there is a lack of security
over the system or where participants are not regulated. 6 3 Automated order
execution may also slow up order executions. Today, many orders are
"arbed" or "flashed" into the pits. This means they are transmitted into
the pits from order desks on the floor by hand signals so that they may be
more rapidly executed.'6 Inputing information into a terminal may slow
liquidity. See Markham, supra note 93, at 45 (discussing concerns that market "feel" may be
lost if trading is completely computerized); Behrmann & Angrist, Men vs. Machines in Bund-
Trading Duel, Wall St. J., Dec. 20, 1990, at Cl, col. 3 (discussing differences between futures
trading in London and Germany: Germany has automated system, while London, which
maintains its lead in trading, has open outcry system); but see Angrist, Futures Trade on
Screens-Except in U.S., Wall St. J., May 21, 1991, at Cl, col. 3 (reporting that "most
traders believe that, ultimately, buying and selling via computer screen will be substantially
cheaper than the 'open-outcry' method of trading," but that U.S. floor traders are slowing
process); see also Andres & Torres, The New Market, Computers Bypass Middleman and Stir
Controversy, Wall St. J., Aug. 28, 1991, at Al, col. 6 (discussing concerns caused by automated
trading systems); Herman, The Next Voice These Traders Hear May Be a Computer, Wall St.
J., May 29, 1991, at B8, col. 1.
162. See OCT. 1987 MARKET BREAK, supra note 112, at 7-21, 9-13 to 9-15. The perform-
ances of these systems were improved during the market break of 1989. See Report of SEC
Division of Market Regulation, Market Analysis of October 13 and 16, 1989, [Current Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,706 (Dec. 1990). Nevertheless, the securities industry has also
been the subject of criticism for their failure to implement high technology that would make
their operations more efficient and reduce market problems. See Kerr & Maguire, Program
Trading-A Critical Analysis, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 991, 1030 (1988); see also Angrist,
Futures Trade on Screens-Except in U.S., Wall St. J., May 21, 1991, at Cl, col. 3 (reporting
that computerized trading systems used abroad for futures instruments have experienced delays
in high volume trading).
163. See Sundel & Blake, Good Concept, Bad Executions: The Regulation and Self-
Regulation in Automated Trading Systems in United States Futures Markets, 85 Nw. U.L.
REv. 748 (1991); see also Tomorrow's World for Traders, EuROWEEK, Nov. 16, 1990 (discussing
security concerns in computerized trading system). An automated system may also cause
difficulties because errors can not be worked out informally. However, it was the informal
system of resolving errors on the commodity futures exchanges that allowed the many fraudulent
transactions exposed by the Chicago sting operation. See Miller, Who Takes Blame When
Trades Short-Circuit?, Wall St. J., Nov. 20, 1990, at Cl, col. 3.
Efforts are being made on an international basis to establish effective regulation over
computerized trading programs. See IOSCO Adopts Principles for Overseeing Electronic
Trading, FIA REv., Nov./Dec. 1990, at 14; International Organization of Securities Commis-
sions, Report of The Technical Committee, Screen-Based Trading Systems for Derivative
Products, 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 25,035 (1990). The CFTC is participating in this
effort. CFTC, Policy Statement Concerning the Oversight of Screen-Based Trading Systems,
2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,953 (1991).
164. See Ashman Testimony, supra note 82, at 5541-42 (discussing fact that written orders
may not be disclosed, while orders flashed into pit are disclosed to everyone); COMMODITY
TRADGiic MANuAL, supra note 1, at 36 (discussing flashing of orders in pits).
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that process slightly. But, it is doubtful whether small orders need to be
flashed to the pits, and because locals on the floor can pick off flashed
orders-i.e., flashing provides locals with greater knowledge of the order
flow-locals can more quickly predict the course of the market from the
nature of the orders being entered. This is unfair to customers and to other
traders. It provides a competitive advantage that is due solely to the
monopoly position of the locals.
Another problem that has plagued the CFTC for many years, and which
has been cited as a leading factor that allowed brokers to engage in the
widespread fraud that was uncovered by the Chicago sting operation, is the
lack of an adequate audit trail. An audit trail allows the CFTC to recreate
trading to determine whether orders were executed competitively and whether
customers received an appropriate price. Over a period of some 15 years,
the CFTC has attempted to tighten the audit trail by requiring the timing
of orders at various stages in the process. The exchanges, after years of
prodding by the CFTC, have also developed computerized programs that
enhance their ability to time the execution of orders in the pits.165 Although
there is still no requirement that the trades be time stamped, several
exchanges are attempting to create hand-held computers that will time orders
so as to alleviate this problem.'1
If the small order execution process is automated, those orders would
be timed and transmitted automatically by a computer to the floor of the
exchange for entry. This would also help guard against the types of fraud
incurred by the Chicago sting operation and against fraudulent order allo-
cations-a common problem of fraud in the industry. For example, a
frequent fraud claim is that when the trades are "winners" customer trades
165. See Markham, supra note 93; Taylor, At Long Last, High-Tech Comes to Chicago's
Commodities Pits, Wall St. J., July 11, 1991, at Cl, col. 4. Congress may mandate further
efforts on timing of executions. See Block, Closing Overnight of Commodities Voted By
House, Wall St. J., March 6, 1991, at C6, col. 6. The CFTC is also continuing to prod the
exchanges into tightening up their audit trails. See Letter from Andrea M. Corcoran, Director,
CFTC Division of Trading and Markets to Thomas R. Donovan, President, Mid-America
Commodity Exchange (Mar. 8, 1989).
166. See New Computerized Order-Entry Device Unveiled by Comex, Wall St. J., Oct.
28, 1989, at C16, col. 6.; Money Line: Futures Plan, U.S.A. Today, Aug. 17, 1989, at B1,
col. 1. The exchanges have argued that provisions in proposed legislation that would tighten
audit trail requirements would hinder them in developing electronic trading systems. See
Salwen, House Panel Votes to Curb Futures Trading, Wall St. J., Feb. 20, 1991, Cl, col. 3.
A bill approved by the House of Representatives would direct the CFTC to conduct a
study to determine whether its rules and regulations are affecting the competitiveness of
contract markets. See H.R. Ra. No. 102-6, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1991). The House Bill
would also require the CFTC to conduct a study to determine whether it is feasible to .conduct
trading in futures and options by computers or other electronic means. Id. The purpose of
these changes would be to enhance access to the futures and option markets by market
participants and improve the ability of the CFTC to audit the activities in those markets and
reduce the opportunity for trading abuses. Id. The Chicago Board of Trade has announced
that it intends to introduce a steel futures contract that will be traded only on computer
screens. New Futures Trading Plan, N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1991, at C12, col. 4.
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are allocated after their execution to favored accounts, while when the
trades are "losers" they are allocated to less favorable customers. 67 If
orders are timed through automated entry, and if the account number must
be added before the order can be entered into the pit, the opportunity for
fraud and collusion would be much diminished and the audit trail would
be much improved. Through such enhancements many concerns with fraud
and improper order execution could be reduced substantially. Of course,
automated execution systems will require a commitment of capital, which
is not a popular prospect in an industry where- revenues are shrinking.1 6
Nevertheless, the technology now seems available and the need is present
for automated entry.
2. A Large Order Execution System Is Needed
Another reform that would introduce more competition to the ex-
changes' present floor monopoly is the creation of large order execution
systems. Unlike the securities exchanges, the commodity exchanges and the
CFTC have prohibited the positioning of large orders prior to their entry
and execution in the pits.169 In the securities industry such positioning is
167. The Commodity Exchange Act was amended in 1968 to assure that its anti-fraud
provisions prevented such order allocation schemes. See 113 CONG. Rc. 23,652 (1967); S.
REP. No. 947, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1968). For examples of cases involving order allocation
schemes, see United States v. Nerlinger, [1987-1990 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) 24,371 (2d Cir. 1988); Jordan v. Clayton Brokerage Co., [1987-1990 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,346 (8th Cir. 1988). The CFTC has also adopted a regulation
designed to prevent floor brokers from allocating orders among customers accounts. See 17
C.F.R. § 155.2(g); Adoption of Dual Trading Regulations [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,242 at 21,295 (C.F.T.C. 1976); see also Stephens IsAwarded Damages
in Fraud Suit Against Geldermann, Wall St. J., Dec. 24, 1990, at 25, col. I (describing
fraudulent order allocation scheme in which trader placed winning trades in account of his
mother, "Academy Award winning actress Mercedes McCambridge").
168. See Power, Brokerages Are Pruning Their Branches, Wall St. J., June 21, 1991, at
Cl, col. 3; Pae, Securities Firms Can Call 1990 Worst Year Yet, Wall St. J., Apr. 5, 1991,
at Cl, col. 3; Leckey, Irresistible Wall St. Hits Immovable Reality, Chi. Tribune, Feb. 11,
1990, § 7, at 4, col. 1; Shearson to Cut Commissions It Pays to Brokers, Chi. Tribune, Nov.
21, 1989, § 3, at 7, col. 1; Widder, New York to Pay for Wall St. Woes, Chi. Tribune, Nov.
10, 1989, § 1, at 1, col. 4. Although Wall Street brokerage firm profits have been reduced in
recent years, futures trading profits are actually expanding. See Tanouye & Taylor, Futures
Trading Appears Headed for Yearly Drop, Wall St. J., July 1, 1991, at Cl, col. 5 (stating
that futures trading volume is declining for first time since 1968); Taylor, Futures Become
Hot as Economy Slumps, Sparing Chicago the Fate of Wall Street, Wall St. J., Dec. 27, 1990,
at Cl, col. 3 (noting that, nevertheless, futures trading volume is down some two percent
from 1989 and that Chicago Mercantile Exchange announced that it would eliminate 52 staff
jobs). The brokerage firms, however, are seeing increased profitability in recent months. See
Siconolfi, Merrill Lynch and Smith Barney Post Record Net, Wall St. J., July 17, 1991, at
Cl, col. 5.
169. 13 J. MARKHAM, COMMODITY REGULATION: FRAUD, MANIPULATION AND OTHER CIMs
§ 14.02 (1987); see also In re Gilchrist, 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,993 (C.F.T.C.
1991); In re Collins, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,982, at
31,903 (C.F.T.C. 1986), modified, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
23,401 (Nov. 26, 1986), rev'd sub nom. Stoller v. CFTC, 834 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1987).
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deemed necessary.to avoid large block trades having an undue effect on the
market and to assure orderly execution of those orders. 70 In fact, there are
over three thousand block trades per day on the NYSE, "accounting for
more than 45 percent of the shares traded. Many of the blocks are of
250,000 shares.' ' 7 1 In contrast, the CFTC and the commodity exchanges
prohibit prior discussions about orders, even if the purpose of such discus-
sions is to assure that there are sufficient buyers in the market to meet
large orders. 72 This restriction causes severe problems, particularly in illiquid
pits.
By approving a large order execution system, prices could be negotiated
off the exchange among institutions. Traders could thereby set prices that
more accurately reflect the value of the commodities being traded, rather
than having these commodities dumped on a market that is unable to deal
with them because of illiquidity or simply because of a lack of prior
knowledge of the transaction. Presently, a proposal by the Chicago Mer-
cantile Exchange is pending for a large order execution system, 73 and a
New York bar committee has recommended that such systems be permitted
for all exchanges. 7 4 The CFTC, however, long delayed action on these
proposals 75 and the Chicago Board of Trade has opposed such a system. 76
170. See Committee on Futures Regulation of the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New
York, Large Order Execution in the Futures Markets, 44 Bus. LAW. 1335, 1335 (1989)
[hereinafter Large Order Executions].
171. ELECTRONIC BuLs AND BEAss, supra note 114, at 8. For a discussion of the growth
of institutional trading on the New York Stock Exchange, see Poser, Restructuring the Stock
Markets: A Critical Look at the SEC's National Market System, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 883, 896-
901 (1981).
172. See supra note 169.
173. See Markham, supra note 93, at 38-39.
174. See Large Order Executions, supra note 170.
175. As a result of the Stock Market Crash of 1987, the SEC suggested that procedures
may be needed to handle large block trades in the stock index and futures markets. OCT. 1987
MARKET BREAK, supra note 112, at 3-18 n.49. The CFTC staff, however, asserted that this
recommendation was simply a "pet theory" of the SEC and others. Andrea M. Corcoran,
"Aftermath of the Crash: Policy Assessments, Public Perceptions and Prospective Reforms,"
Address at the Japanese Center for International Finance 11 (Mar. 1988). More recently, at
the request of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, the CFTC indicated some willingness to
adopt a modified large order execution system by amending its rules to allow such systems if
they meet the CFTC's approval. Large Order Execution Procedures And The Crossing of
Orders, 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 25,019 (C.F.T.C. 1991). It subsequently approved
such a system on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. Merc is Cleared to Trade Stock Index
Futures Block, Wall St. J., Oct. 1, 1991, at C16, col. 6. The CFTC staff has also suggested
that, if dual trading is to be continued, "there are other mechanisms, such as the use of
market makers, sunshine trading (a form of block trading), or large or small order trade
execution procedures which might serve the liquidity functions which historically have been
attributed to dual trading." Letter from-Andrea M. Corcoran, Director of CFTC Division of
Trading and Markets to Thomas R. Donovan, President, Mid-American Commodity Exchange
(Mar. 8, 1989) at 3. But the CFTC may condition the use of large order execution systems
on a requirement that such orders be disclosed to the trading pit and identified prior to
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It seems inconceivable that large order transactions, which in the se-
curities industry are deemed to be desirable and proper, should somehow
become illegal when conducted in the commodity futures industry. This
contrast underscores the fact that the Commodity Exchange Act may rightly
be viewed as simply a protective measure for the commodity exchanges and
their members, at whatever the cost to other market participants. In this
context, the statute is simply being invoked to assure the monopoly advan-
tages of locals. They are now assured that they will have the first shot at
all orders-large and small-under the monopoly conditions that exist on
the floors.
3. Market Maker Obligations And Dual Trading
The time and place advantage given to floor traders must also be
examined. Commodity futures prices are highly volatile. Indeed, futures
contracts on commodities are selected in large measure on the fact that
their prices are volatile. The time and place advantage given to floor traders
is critical to their competitive edge in that they can react to price changes
more rapidly than traders located off the floor. Even with modern com-
munication facilities, the time required to report what is happening in the
pit from the floor and the time for that information to be assessed at an
off-exchange location often presents a strong competitive disadvantage to
those trading off the floor, particularly under chaotic conditions.
For a number of years the SEC considered whether floor traders should
even be permitted on the securities exchanges and it has restricted their
access. 7 7 However, eliminating or reducing the number of locals on com-
execution. Letter to Thomas A. Russo from Andrea M. Corcoran, Director, CFTC Division
of Trading and Markets, (Oct. 17, 1989). Customer consent may also be required. Id.
176. The Chicago Board of Trade recognizes that institutional traders are playing a much
larger role in the futures markets. Early & Drizin, CFTC/SEC Jurisdiction: 1990, Deja-Vu
All Over Again, Memorandum Prepared for the FIA Law and Compliance Division Annual
Workshop, Alexandria, Virginia (May 3-4, 1990) at 22; see also Markham, Federal Regulation
of Margin In The Commodity Futures Industry-History and Theory, 64 TErn,. L. REv. 59
(1991); White, Wall Street Is Giving Big Clients Its Program Trading Firepower, Wall St. J.,
May 1, 1991, at Cl, col. 3; Angrist, Virginia's Pension Fund Earmarks $100 Million for
Futures Trading, Wall St. J., Apr. 26, 1991, at Cl, col. 4. However, the Chicago Board of
Trade continues to oppose large order execution systems needed for institutional trading. See
Letter from Thomas R. Donovan, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Chicago Board
of Trade to Mrs. Jean A. Webb, Office of the Secretariat, CFTC (Jan. 4, 1990); see also
Letter from Bennett J. Corn, President, Coffee, Sugar & Cocoa Exchange, Inc., to Ms. Jean
A. Webb, Secretary, CFTC (Jan. 22, 1991). This may be because the number of "upstairs
traders" has placed increased competitive pressure on the floor and has "made it tougher to
make a living in the pit. Sometimes it can be 'hell on wheels."' Kollar, Melamed Remains a
Vocal Force Despite Departure from the CME, J. Com., Jan. 30, 1991; see also Markham,
supra note 93, at 38. Nevertheless, large order execution problems persist. See Tanouye, Comex
Investigating Big July Silver Trade, Wall St. J., Aug. 6, 1991, at Cl, col. 3 (discussing
difficulties with large order execution on commodity exchanges).
177. See 15 U.S.C. § 78k (1988); Special Study, supra note 141, at 5-7; SEC, REPORT OF
THE FEASIBILITY AND ADVISABIITY OF THE COMPLETE SEGREGATION OF THE FUNCTION OF DEALER
AND BROKER 109-114 (1936); 17 C.F.R. § 240.1la-1 (1991); V L. Loss & J. SELIGMAN, supra
note 127, at 2531-44; J. SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATnON OF WALL STREET 228-343 (1982).
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modity exchanges might have the undesirable effect of impairing liquidity
on the commodity exchanges because the locals supply trading volume for
hedging and for executing customer orders. Nevertheless, corrective measures
are needed to assure that this time and place advantage is not abused by
the individuals now holding exchange franchises. In this regard, the Chicago
Board Options Exchange, which utilizes an auction market modeled after
the commodity exchanges, has imposed market maker obligations on floor
traders on its floors. Similarly, specialists on other securities exchanges are
required to have marketmaking obligations. 7 8 This means that such traders
must buy or sell contra to market direction in order to reduce volatility.
There are no such obligations in the commodity futures industry. If locals
are to continue their time and place advantage, however, such restrictions
should be imposed so that the public will be assured that the competitive
advantage given to those traders is not abused. 7 9
Another problem with floor traders and floor brokers faced by the
CFTC is the fact that these persons may engage in both roles-i.e., someone
178. See REPORT OF THE SPECIAL STUDY OF THE OPnONS MARKETS TO THE SEC 130-135
(Dec. 22, 1978); OCT. 1987 MARKET BREAK, supra note 112, at 4-1 to 4-3; 17 C.F.R. § 240.1lb-
1 (1991). Indeed, the SEC believes that marketmaking obligations are the very essence of an
exchange. See Board of Trade v. SEC, 923 F.2d 1270 (7th Cir. 1991). These market maker
obligations, however, have not eliminated the time and place advantage of specialists on the
New York Stock Exchange. These specialists "unquestionably" have "access to valuable
nonpublic information. Specialists can and.do earn greater than average returns by exploiting
this information regularly." Note, The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, Economic Theory
and the Regulation of the Securities Industry,'29 STAN. L. REv. 1031, 1054 (1977). Market-
makers in the securities industry also did not perform well during the-stock market crash of
1987. See Markham & Stephanz, The Stock Market Crash of 1987-The United States Looks
At New Recommendations, 76 GEo. L.J. 1993 (1988).
For a discussion of the role of the specialist in the securities market, see generally V L.
Loss & J. SEUGMANJ, supra note 127, at 2513-30. The SEC has proposed regulations that
would impose further market making obligations on specialists by requiring them to enter
"stabilizing" transactions where there is a sharp market break. Benham, Deal Is Struck on
Index-Futures Oversight, Investors Daily, Oct. 18, 1990.
Recently Congress enacted legislation that authorizes the SEC to adopt rules to prohibit
or contain during periods of extraordinary market volatility any trading practice which the
SEC determines has previously contributed to market volatility and has threatened the main-
tenance of fair and orderly markets and is likely to do so in the future. See Market Reform
Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 93 (1990).
179. The commodity exchanges have also begun to experiment with market making
obligations. Markham, supra note 9, at 363. But the CFTC has stated that the Commodity
Exchange Act "does not define the term 'market maker,' does not impose an affirmative
obligation on floor traders to perform the role of market makers and does not regulate their
activities as a separate class of traders." In re Buckwalter, 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
25,016 at 37,769 (C.F.T.C. 1991) (footnote omitted). However, to cite one recent example,
the refusal by floor traders on the futures exchanges to assume any market making obligations
proved to be troublesome during the recent war with Iraq in the Persian Gulf. See Taylor,
Oil Options Investors Irked by Trade Delays, Wall St. J., Jan. 22, 1991, at Cl, col. 3.
Customers also continue to be subject to untoward "slippages" between market prices at the
time of order entry and execution. See Angrist, Futures Shock: Investors Cope With 'Slippage',
Wall St. J., Apr. 30, 1991, at Cl, col. 3.
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can be both a floor trader and a floor broker on the same day. This often
gives rise to claims of conflict of interest when traders are engaged in this
so-called "dual" trading. Dual trading creates conflicts of interest when
members trade both for their own account and for customers' and often
leads to charges of fraud by the brokers. The CFTC is now considering
whether to prohibit dual trading, particularly in light of the problems on
the exchanges uncovered by the FBI sting operation in 1989. But it should
be noted that the CFTC has been unsuccessfully wrestling with this problem
for over 15 years. The CFTC has attempted to stop such dual trading for
years and Congress has addressed the issue several times, but the exchanges
have effectively blocked the elimination of this apparent conflict of interest.
That reform should now be effected, at least in active trading pits, for no
reason other than to bolster public confidence in these markets. 80
Reforms of a more far reaching nature are also needed. For example,
a reform needed to combat floor broker abuses is the adoption of a trading
system in which customer orders are placed in a book for execution,
preferably an automated book. Presently, the Chicago Board Options Ex-
change, which is regulated by the SEC, has a board broker system in which
exchange employees hold customer limit orders in a so-called "book."
Those orders are executed and given preference in the marketplace when
their limits are reached."" The board broker system professionalizes order
executions by reducing the need for "independent" floor brokers who often
are so poorly capitalized they cannot sustain errors without cheating. Such
a system would do much to eliminate the abuses exposed in the Chicago
sting. The locals would not have the opportunity that now exists to prey
on floor brokers. Instead, the board broker would be responsible to the
whole trading pit and competing locals would seek to expose anyone being
given preference in order executions. This system would better serve to keep
both parties honest.
Another area of concern is that most large financial firms trade for
their customers and for their own account or for those of their affiliates,
particularly in the financial futures area. Traders on the so-called "propri-
etary" desk who are trading for the firm's or its affiliates' accounts may
often be exposed to information concerning customer orders. This gives rise
to conflicts of interest, as where market direction may be known because
of a large influx of customer orders, allowing abuses such as front running
to be engaged in by proprietary traders. 82
180. See Markham, supra note 93; but see Donohue, Dual Trading in the Commodity
Futures Markets: Should it be Banned?, 21 Loy. U. Ci. L.J. 45 (1989) (suggesting increased
regulation of dual trading, but not banning of practice).
181. OCT. 1987 MARKET BREAK, supra note 112, at 8-I to 8-2. The specialist on the New
York Stock Exchange also has an automated limit order book. Id. at 7-20. New technological
changes may allow the New York Stock Exchange to reduce its staff, an action that is needed
in order to reduce costs. See Torres, Big Board Plans Wide-Scale Layoffs to Reduce Costs,
Wall St. J., Feb. 11, 1991, at C9, col. 5.
182. A former senior exectitive of one large brokerage firm has charged that he was fired
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To prevent abuses by proprietary trades of brokerage firms, so-called
"Chinese walls" should be erected between the proprietary trading and
activities of customers. Such systems already exist in the securities and
banking industry.8 3 Chinese walls in the futures industry may not be simple
or inexpensive. If proprietary trading is too small to sustain segregation, it
can be routed through another brokerage firm. Other restrictions should be
imposed upon upstairs activities. Some large brokerage firms have common
order desks for particular exchanges where both proprietary trades and
customer trades are routed to the floor. Proprietary traders may often be
stationed around this desk, and the information they receive is invaluable
as to market direction and what can be expected of the market, as where
from the firm because he refused demands to divulge information to proprietary traders about
the trading plans of futures customers. Potts & Lippman, Is This Any Way to Set Oil Prices?,
Wash. Post, Jan. 12, 1991, at Al, col. 4; see also Big Board Acts To Discipline Two
Companies, Wall St. J., May 31, 1991, at A9A, col. 3 (reporting that NYSE disciplined a
broker and its employees, including a $1.3 million fine for altering program trade prices in
favor of the firm and stating that it was unclear whether futures trading was involved, but
that program trading is "often accompanied by simultaneous selling or buying of stock option
or futures").
One exchange official has asserted that further regulations are needed to prevent individuals
working "on a brokerage house order desk from taking an order and winking at his friend
across the room, who takes the cue to place his own order ahead of the customer." Tanouye,
Coffee Exchange's New Chairman Faces Controversy in a Low-Profile Market, Wall St. J.,
Apr. 1, 1991, at C6, col. 3; see also Sundel & Blake, supra note 163, at 775 (discussing
"upstairs" trading abuses by brokerage firm employees having knowledge of customer orders).
Trading ahead or "running ahead" of customer orders has long been a problem on the
exchanges. See Regulation of Commodity Exchanges, Hearing on H.R. 3009 (Commodity
Exchange Act), Before the House Committee on Agriculture, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 29-30
(1935). It has also long been known that there is a conflict of interest where a broker is
executing orders for customers and trading for the firm's own account. Id. at 25; see also
United States v. Dial, 757 F.2d 163, 165, 168 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 838 (1985). A
recent report suggests other concerns such as "loading the boat." This occurs where a brokerage
firm holds customer orders and then enters them all at once to push up market prices-
"traders can make money if they hop on for a cruise." Taylor, Psst! Want to Make a Small
Fortune in Futures Markets?, Wall St. J., Aug. 30, 1991, at Al, col. 3.
The CFTC has adopted a regulation to prevent some abuses by brokerage firms, but it
has not adopted a segregation of functions requirement. See 17 C.F.R. § 155.3 (1991). This
regulation states that brokerage firms are to ensure to the extent possible that customer market
orders are transmitted to the floor before proprietary orders. It does not, however, exclude
proprietary traders for the brokerage firm from having access to the customer market orders
or to limit orders. The latter are also invaluable in determining what may occur if a market
responds in a particular direction because limit orders may accentuate price swings when limits
are reached.
183. See Herzel & Coiling, The Chinese Wall and Conflict of Interest in Banks, 34 Bus.
LAW. 73 (1978); Poser, Chinese Wall or Emperor's New Clothes? Regulating Conflicts of
Interest of Securities Firms in the U.S. and the U.K., 9 MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 91
(1988). The need for a "Chinese Wall" in the futures industry was suggested long ago by
regulatory authorities. See U.S.D.A., Commodity Exchange Authority, Administrative Deter-
mination No. 114 (May 21, 1941) (determining that trader of a firm "house account" would
not violate Commodity Exchange Act by trading against customer orders if the trader did not
have knowledge of the orders).
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stop orders are backed up at a particular resistant point in the market.
Here too, there should be a segregation of trading activities.
4. A Curb Market is Needed
The Chicago sting operation demonstrates a need for a curb market for
after hours trading. A justification given by brokers for the after hours
trading is that the closing moments on the exchange are often chaotic and
it is impossible to execute customer orders in an orderly fashion. Therefore,
it is necessary to continue trading after the closing bell. Otherwise customers
will be denied fills and can be exposed to substantial risks if their orders
are not filled. Floor traders believe that giving the customer a fill is critical
to the customers and that the customers will accept fills even if the prices
are not as competitive as they would otherwise be in a fair and orderly
market during regular trading hours.1 4
Given the fact that there is an exchange monopoly, and that customers
cannot execute their orders other than through a commodity exchange, curb
markets do appear to be a needed feature of the exchanges. This is because
there is no safety valve such as that found in the securities markets for
over-the-counter or after hours trading in securities. 18 The CFTC, however,
is now authorizing such curb markets and is setting the terms and conditions
under which such trading is permitted. For example, the exchanges are
authorized to have additional closing sessions during particularly tumultuous
184. See Ashman Testimony, supra note 79, at 5388-89, 5449. Floor traders have also
used after hours trading to even up their position-i.e., a trader may not want to carry a
position over night and will want to liquidate the position in the closing session. If that is not
possible because of chaotic trading conditions, he will seek to trade with other traders after
the close of trading in order to make himself "flat," thereby avoiding an over night exposure.
This has long been a practice in the futures industry. 5 REPORT ON THE GRAIN TRADE, supra
note 10, at 147.
,185. Some commodity futures exchanges have extended their trading hours to allow
evening sessions. See War Means No Sleep for CBOT Traders, Wall St. J., Jan. 29, 1991, at
Cl, col. 3; Herman & Torres, Up All Night Watching the War? Got An Urge to Trade?,
Wall St. J., Jan. 22, 1991, at Cl, col. 3. In addition, linkages have been developed with
foreign exchanges to allow extended trading hours, although these have not been particularly
successful. See Markham & Bergin, The Role of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
in International Commodity Transactions, 18 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 581, 596-598
(1985); Wolman, Singapore 5; From A Slow Start to Soaring Trading Volumes, Fin. Times,
Nov. 13, 1987, at V; Exchanges Continue to Forge Trading Links Despite Slow Volume To
Date, SEC. WK., July 6, 1987, at 1.
A phenomenon known as EFPs (exchange of futures for physicals) has also been utilized
to extend trading hours. Simply stated, these transactions involve a swap of a physical or a
forward contract for a futures contract. Exchanges in London trade in forward contracts and
these have been swapped for futures contracts outside normal trading hours of the U.S.
exchanges. See generally CFTC DIVISION OF TRADING AND MARKETS, REPORT ON EXCHANGES
OF FUTURES FOR PHYSICALS (Oct. 1, 1987); Seifert, Exchanges of Futures for Physicals
Transactions: A Regulatory Exception and Means for Off-Price Exchange Use of Exchange-
Traded Instruments, Futures Industry Association, L. & Compliance Div. Annual Workshop,
Annapolis, Md. (May 20-21, 1986); Large Order Executions, supra note 170.
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markets. This, of course, should not be administered in a way that will
result in extended trading hours that create a need for even further extended
after hours trading.'8 6
Principally in response to foreign competition, the exchanges have been
developing automated systems that would allow after hours trading. For
example, the Globex system is designed to allow computerized order entry
for after hours trading. Globex essentially seeks to extend trading to a
twenty-four hour a day basis. This would do much to alleviate the need
for curb trading, although a curb session may be necessary to complete
order overflows in busy closing sessions on the floor of the exchange itself.
The Globex system should also provide an audit trail that should allow
better surveillance of after hours executions. 8 7
5. Specific Trading Prohibitions Are Needed
Another shortcoming in the Commodity Exchange Act is that its pro-
hibitions against fraud, manipulation and abusive trading practices are often
vague and undefined. The Commodity Exchange Act is further limited by
the fact that the CFTC has not adopted rules prohibiting particular fraud-
ulent or abusive practices (whether from deference to the industry or because
it views its rulemaking authority to be too narrow is uncertain). The most
dramatic example of this shortcoming is the fact that, while a central focus
of the Commodity Exchange Act is to prohibit manipulation, the term
"manipulation" is not defined anywhere in the statute. In addition, the Act
does not give the CFTC authority to define that provision. The result has
been a piecemeal approach to defining and prohibiting manipulation that
186. For example, the curb market session would be signaled by a bell in the trading
ring. At that time, no further orders could be accepted at any trading desk. Only orders
already on the floor could be transmitted to the pit for execution. The after hour session
should be brief-as little as three minutes should be sufficient to allow a cleanup of existing
orders. The CFTC has approved rules of this nature, which also allow exchange members to
even up their positions after the close of trading. Rosenbaum, Contested Trades: Hot Potato
or Hot Air?, FUTURES MAG., Jan. 1991.
187. See Gunning for Globex, FtruE~s AND OPTIONS WORLD, Nov. 1990, at 30; CHICAGO
MERCANTILE EXCHANGE, GLOBEX (1989); Berg, 2 Big Futures Exchanges in a Race, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 11, 1989, at D2, col. I. The Globex system is an automated trading system, but it would
be open only for after hours trading. Globex is so limited in scope because the exchanges
continue to resist "bringing technology into their domestic trading pits during the normal
trading day." ELECTRONIC BULLS AND BEARS, supra note 111, at 5; see also Kollar, Melamed
Remains a Vocal Force Despite Departure from the CME, J. Com., Jan. 30, 1991 (stating
that Globex was designed so that it would not reduce the income of the traders on the floors
of the exchanges). Nevertheless, the Globex system may siphon off a substantial number of
orders out of the commodity futures pits. See McMurray, Riding High: Tom Baldwin's Trades
in Chicago T-Bond Pit Can Move the Market, Wall St. J., Feb. 4, 1991, at Cl, col. 1; see
also Durr, Globex "On Target for Launch Early Next Year", Fin. Times, Nov. 6, 1990; New
York Merc Advances After-Hours Trading Plan, Wall St. J., at A14, col. 4 (discussing efforts
by one New York exchange to establish after hours trading network).
1991] 1027
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:977
has led to an almost complete evisceration of this purpose of the statute.'
But the failure to exercise rulemaking authority is not a problem that
is limited simply to manipulation. That shortcoming pervades much of the
Commodity Exchange Act. For example, the government has often been
stymied in policing and preventing abusive trading practices because it has
not promulgated rules that attack particular fraudulent or abusive trading
practices.189 This failure stands in stark contrast to actions taken by the
SEC pursuant to the federal securities laws. The SEC has been given broad
authority to promulgate rules that attack specific practices. The SEC has
used this authority to adopt strong regulatory programs.' 90 The results are
dramatic. For example, while the CFTC has only brought some 15 manip-
ulation cases in its entire history, the SEC brings nearly that number of
cases each year. 91
This gap in the Commodity Exchange Act actually fosters trading
practices that are fraudulent or abusive. The so-called "leads," "edges,"
and "matches" that were exposed by the Chicago sting operation are not
specifically prohibited by the Commodity Exchange Act, even though they
seem to have been present in the markets for many years. The Commodity
Exchange Act does prohibit "accommodation" trades, "cross" trades,
"wash" sales or "fictitious" trades, but those terms are not defined in the
statute and are of uncertain scope. 92 For example, there is confusion as to
exactly what constitutes an "accommodation" trade. A federal study con-
ducted in 1921 suggested that accommodation trades were simply transfers
of positions between brokerage houses so that margin requirements could
be reduced. 93 Such transactions were innocuous and far removed from the
188. See Markham, supra note 9. Another gap in the Commodity Exchange Act that
fosters disruptive trading and manipulation is the fact that there is no effective regulation of
large scale trading by commercial firms. Id. at 367-71; see also Kanabayashi & Behrmenn,
Sunitomo's Hamanaka Inspires Anger and Respect In Pit, Wall St. J., May 29, 1991, at Cl,
col. 3.
189. The reason for the failure to adopt such rules is unclear. It may be due to the
ideological bent of the CFTC whose individual Commissioners have generally been economists
that oppose regulation in almost any form. Moreover, there is no specific provision in the
Commodity Exchange Act that provides for rulemaking authority to prohibit manipulation or
specific fraudulent conduct. Although there is an overall broad provision that authorizes the
Commission to adopt such rules as are necessary to carry out the purposes of the statute, the
CFTC has not placed much reliance on that provision. See 7 U.S.C. § 12a(5) (1988); see also
supra note 31 (discussing scope of this provision).
190. See supra note 30.
191. See Markham, supra note 9, at 361-62. Of course, the SEC has a larger staff and
its focus on the manipulation of the stock of a particular company is more narrow than a
broad based commodity manipulation that is often faced by the CFTC. But those shortcomings
would actually argue in favor of the CFTC being given more pointed authority so that it
could husband its resources and so that it would not have to address the economics of a
broad market manipulation. Instead, it could attack specific manipulative practices more
effectively. See id.
192. See 7 U.S.C. § 6c (1988).
193. See 5 REPORT ON Tm GRANL TRADE, supra note 10, at 251-52.
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trading practices that were the subject of the sting operations in Chicago.
Similarly, the term "cross" trade is not defined in the Commodity Exchange
Act. In the debates on the statute in 1936, however, cross trades were
defined as transactions that approximate "matched" trades-i.e., cross
trades are devices "commonly employed by pit brokers who are becoming
buyers in respect to selling orders of customers and vice versa."' 194 This
term, however, was the subject of much debate because there was concern
that prohibiting cross trades could suppress legitimate transactions, such as
where a broker was executing buy and sell orders for different customers
competitively in the market place. 195 The prohibition against "fictitious"
trades is equally uncertain in scope. Indeed, in United States v. LaMantia,196
a district court held that this term was so vague as to be unconstitutional. 97
Seeking to clear up that vagueness, the CFTC later stated that a fictitious
sale would include prearranged trading in which trade information such as
price and quantity were determined outside the trading pit, "then using the
market mechanism to shield the private nature of the bargaining from public
scrutiny, both price competition and market risk are eliminated. 9 8 But this
formula is unintelligible and offers little or no guidance as to what is
permitted under the Commodity Exchange Act.
The government has also encountered difficulties in determining what
a prohibited "wash" sale is under the Commodity Exchange Act. In Stoller
v. CFTC,199 the Second Circuit found that the CFTC had taken conflicting
positions on what constituted a wash trade and it, therefore, dismissed a
CFTC action charging that a trader had engaged in wash trading when he
made simultaneous purchase and sale transactions. More recently, the CFTC
has conducted investigations and brought charges against various Japanese
trading houses that have engaged in simultaneous buy and sell transactions
for Japanese tax purposes.3 In one such case, an ALJ dismissed the
CFTC's charges of wash trading because the CFTC did not show that there
was an improper purpose to the trades in question. 20 1 The Chicago Board
194. 80 CONG. REc. 8088-90 (1936).
195. See 80 CONG. REc. 7871, 7905-06 (1936).
196. [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,667 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
197. Id. The court in LaMantia noted that the term "fictitious" sale was not defined in
the Commodity Exchange Act; that even though the Commodity Exchange Act had been in
existence for over forty years, there had been no judicial construction of that term; and that
treatises on commodity trading did not use the term "fictitious" sale. Id.
198. In re Collins, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,982
(C.F.T.C. 1986), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Stoller v. CFTC, 834 F.2d 262 (2d Cir.
1987).
199. 834 F.2d 762 (2d Cir. 1987).
200. See CFTC Settles with Balfour Maclaine, Tokyo Broker, Ex-Officers, SEc. WK.,
Apr. 23, 1990, at 6; CFTC News Release No. 3238-90 (April 18, 1990).
201. In re Three Eight Corp., 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,944 (C.F.T.C. 1990).
Compare In re Angelo, 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,943 (C.F.T.C. 1990) (holding that
so-called "ginzy" trades used to shift funds from one account to another had not been shown
to be prearranged or non-competitive) with In re Murphy, [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,798 (C.F.T.C. 1985) (holding so-called "ginzy" trades to be violative
of the Commodity Exchange Act).
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of Trade has also taken issue with a CFTC staff assertion that floor brokers
on the exchanges are responsible for knowing the purpose of traders entering
simultaneous buy and sell transactions. 20 2
The confusion surrounding what constitutes a wash sale seems incredible.
This is perhaps the most basic market abuse and has long been dealt with
in the securities markets. 20 3 Such trades are certainly no stranger to the
futures markets, having been attacked for many years by the Commodity
Exchange Authority. 204 The CFTC, however, has in a recent series of cases
made the situation much worse and made punishment of wash sales and
abuses such as those uncovered by the Chicago sting operation even more
difficult to prove and prevent.
These cases arose from early efforts by the CFTC to attack fraudulent
trading practices that were being used to avoid and evade taxes during the
1970s. The CFTC brought several cases charging that so-called "tax spreads"
were being executed by wash trades or pre-arranged and fictitious trades so
as to assure tax losses.20 Grand juries were empaneled in New York and
Chicago to attack these practices and several convictions resulted. 206 Those
criminal cases, however, apparently had little lingering deterrent effect as
evidenced by the Chicago sting operation. In addition, the CFTC delayed
final action on many of the tax related cases it brought. Indeed, it did not
render a decision on some of them for ten or more years after the events
at issue. Unfortunately, aside from the weakened deterrent effect of such
delays, these decisions do little to elucidate exactly what trading practices
are prohibited under the Commodity Exchange Act. They speak in broad
generalities and turn on individual issues of proof. In each case the CFTC
found a failure of proof. Indeed, the CFTC's case-by-case approach actually
appears to be a step backward.
For example, in In re Allen J. Rosenberg, the CFTC dismissed charges
against a respondent because, while the trading was suspicious, the CFTC
Division of Enforcement could not tell whether apparent "money pass"
202. See Chicago Board of Trade, Monthly Letter to Members, Jan. 1990, at 1-2.
203. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(1) (1988); Goddard v. United States, 86 F.2d 884 (10th
Cir. 1936); Harris v. United States, 48 F.2d 771 (9th Cir. 1931); United States v. Brown, 5
F. Supp. 81, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), aff'd, 79 F.2d 321 (2d Cir. 1935), cert. denied sub nom.
McCarthy v. United States, 296 U.S. 650 (1936); but see Wright v. SEC, 112 F.2d 89, 93-94
(2d Cir. 1940).
204. See In re Goldwurm, 7 Agric. Dec. 265 (1948); In re Thomas Jordan & Co., 7
Agric. Dec. 381 (1948); see also CFTC v. Savage, 611 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1979) (discussing
abusive trading practices attacked by Commodity Exchange Authority).
205. See 13 J. MARKHAM, supra note 169, at § 14.01.
206. See Laing, U.S. Study of Soybean Trading Is Seen Leading to Tax Law, Other
Indictments, Wall St. J., Aug. 9, 1976, at 18, col. 2; United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769
(2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1007 (1981); Sundheimer v. CFTC, 688 F.2d 150 (2d
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1022 (1983); United States v. LaMantia, [1977-1980 Transfer
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,667 (N.D. Iil. 1978). For a more complete listing of
these criminal cases, see American Bar Association, Section of Litigation, CRME IN TH Prrs:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE INVESTIGATION AT THE CHICAGO COMMODITIES MARKETS Tab. 3 (1990).
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transactions were gifts, kickbacks, rebates, or whatever. 20 7 There, the trader
claimed that he was actually a "marketmaker" who had to take the risks
of losing positions in order to protect his overall financial position.208 The
CFTC found that this justification for the unusual trading patterns at issue
precluded the Division of Enforcement from establishing its case, at least
in the absence of proof showing that the trading was for some improper
purpose. 209 But this approach underscores the need for more adequate
regulation. The enforcement staff simply cannot reach into the minds of
traders or penetrate a conspiracy without undergoing an elaborate sting
operation such as that seen in Chicago.
In another of these cases, In re Buckwalter, which was decided some
thirteen years after the events in question, the CFTC noted that the conduct
at issue established a pattern of trading that created an inference of
arrangement for non-competitive execution of futures contracts. 210 The CFTC
found that the respondents had engaged in a series of trades that realized
a loss at a convenient time, with both realizing a comparable gain at later
convenient time. The CFTC, therefore, found a pattern of suspicious
conduct in the trading at issue. It stated, however, that such suspicious
conduct may not be enough to prove a violation unless such conduct is
coupled with a motive. Here, there was motivation because of tax benefits.
But there was a failure of proof as to some aspects of the case because it
was not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that two individuals
had engaged in violative trading. Certain payments which respondents
claimed to be disguised payments to one respondent were not proven to be
violative even though the trading was "certainly suspicious" and involved
the passing of trading profits to an account that a respondent controlled
under a false name.2 1 The CFTC also found implausible that two respon-
dents would engage in an arrangement for noncompetitive executions that
created losses for them and gains for the respondent.2 1 2 This seems almost
naive since the Chicago sting operation exposed the fact that transfers of
money were often done through trading in the pits.213
207. 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,992 (C.F.T.C. 1991).
208. Id. at 37,642.
209. Id. at 37,644.
210. 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,995 (C.F.T.C. 1991).
211. Id. at 37,685.
212. Id. at 37,685-86.
213. See Proposed Rule Concerning Restriction on Dual Trading by Floor Brokers, 55
Fed. Reg. 1047 (Jan. 11, 1990) (discussing money pass transactions in sting operation). More
recently, the CFTC's Division of Enforcement has asserted that:
Commission case law also establishes that wash sales occur when traders, through
non-competitive executions, arrange to pass money to each other. In In re Gimbel,
24,213 at 35,004, the Commission, citing In re Robert E. O'Grady, 30 A.D. 1635
(1971), reaffirmed that money pass transactions violate the wash sale provision of
section 3c(a)(A) of the Act.
Division of Enforcement's Pre-Hearing Memorandum, In re Bell, CFTC Doe. No. 90-29 at
27 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 11, 1991).
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In In re Bear Stearns, another of the long delayed CFTC decisions, the
CFTC found that the record did not support charges against two respondents
and the case against them was reversed.21 4 Once again, the CFTC gave little
guidance as to what is permitted or prohibited and how these cases can be
proved. Indeed, the burden of proof established by the CFTC was almost
unsurmountable, as perhaps demonstrated by the fact that this case took
some fourteen years to be resolved by the CFTC.
In still another long delayed decision, In re Gilchrist, the CFTC again
considered non-competitive trading claims that were apparently based upon
tax trading. 2 5 Charges against certain respondents were also reversed in that
case. The CFTC found itself stymied in this case because it was not clear
what the respondents' motivation was when they entered into the trades in
question. The CFTC stated that a respondent's mere participation in trades
that are consistent with one or more arrangements for noncompetitive
transactions was not a reliable basis for inferring that he knowingly partic-
ipated in noncompetitive trades. 216 One respondent was held liable because
he had segregated the trades in question in a separate account. Other traders
had not done this and it was unclear as to their motivation. Charges against
them were dismissed.
Among other things, the CFTC also reversed a finding in Gilchrest that
a respondent engaged in a wash sale. The CFTC stated that generally in
considering whether a prohibited wash sale has occurred it will look for a
(1) purchase and sale (2) of the same delivery month of the same futures
contract (3) at the same (or a similar) price. 217 Here, however, the nullity
that was obtained was not the result of a transaction in the same futures
contract. Rather, losses were offset in futures contracts different from those
in which gains had been obtained. Nevertheless, the CFTC found that other
trading by certain respondents was noncompetitive. In reference to those
trades, the CFTC stated that the prices could be deemed to be "true" in
some limited sense but this could not be deemed bona fide for purposes of
the Commodity Exchange Act. 218 The CFTC stated that, even where a
prearranged trade is executed in the pit, such a transaction will be deemed
to be fictitious because, while the execution appears to be the result of
open outcry, the prearrangement of the trade negates risk and price com-
petition.2 9 It is unclear what this means.
The result of all these decisions is to place an almost impossible burden
on anyone seeking to prove that abusive trading practices violate the
Commodity Exchange Act. It appears that the CFTC will require direct
proof that challenged transactions are done in a noncompetitive manner.
This would require a matched result or a series of transactions that are
214. 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,994 (C.F.T.C. 1991).
215. 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,993 (C.F.T.C. 1991).
216. Id. at 37,651.
217. Id. at 37,653.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 37,653, n.26.
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unlikely to have occurred in the absence of prearrangement. Upon such
proof, the trades may be deemed "suspicious," but something more is
required to prove a violation. It would seem that the CFTC requires some
strong proof of motivation for engaging in noncompetitive transactions, or
some other form of proof to show that there is something more than mere
suspicious activity. The CFTC seeks to do this in order not to restrict
"legitimate" activity. The result, however, is effectively to foster abusive
trading because it is particularly difficult to establish suspicious trading
patterns when, as was seen in the Chicago sting operation, traders interject
third parties to "scratch" trades in order to cover up the fact that they
were given to other traders as matches or leads. To try to establish
noncompetitive activity in a liquid market where patterns of suspicious
activity are much more difficult to isolate may well be impossible. When a
requirement of establishing motive is coupled with the foregoing obstacles,
prosecution becomes problematic. These cases, therefore, constitute a severe
setback for effective regulation and may undercut everything that may have
been accomplished by the Chicago sting operation.
What is needed are rules specifically describing what transactions are
prohibited. Such rules can be applied precisely and promptly to violative
activity. The difficulty with formulating rules by adjudicatory decision, such
as the CFTC sought to do in the above cases, is that such rules tend to be
stated in broad generalities. This is because of the CFTC's concern that, if
its prohibitions are too precise in their definition, legitimate transactions
may be impaired. That concern can be avoided by rules. Rules can be
specific in their prohibitions and legitimate practices can be pointed out by
commentators and exempted. Conversely, unique or ingenious fraud schemes
can be addressed in the context of the broader prohibitions of the statute,
or even a blanket fraud provision.
The CFTC should be given authority to adopt rules that would define
and prohibit specific fraudulent and manipulative trading practices. A good
start for such rules would be simply to take the testimony elicited in the
Chicago sting operations and adopt rules that would attack those specific
practices. Other rules would prohibit such fraudulent trading practices as
"frontrunning," where a trader with advance knowledge of an order that
would have market effect trades in advance of that order. 20 Manipulative
trading practices should be banned and insider trading prohibition should
be considered.2'
220. For examples of such rules, see Markham, supra note 93, at 48-51. Efforts are also
being made in the securities industry to impose regulations that seek to prevent front running
abuses. See Salwen, House Approves Measure Giving SEC Power to Act Against Program
Trading, Wall St. J., Oct. 1, 1990, at C10, col. 5. Even advocates of greed in the markets
would seem to be in favor of rules that prevent the defrauding of customers by shuffling
losses to the public and keeping profits for floor traders. See Ibaszak, Federal Judge Makes
the Case for Greed In The Markets, Chi. Sun-Times, Nov. 16, 1990.
221. The CFTC previously rejected the concept of insider trading under the Commodity
Exchange Act except for government or exchange officials. CFTC, A STUDy OF Tm NATuRE,
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IV. CONCLUSION
The franchise given to exchange members denies access to the floor to
all but a limited group of individuals who must recover the high cost of
their franchise and maintain profitability in an extremely volatile environ-
ment. Traders on the floor of the exchanges who trade for their own
accounts must make profits consistently in order to survive. This places a
strong incentive on these floor traders or "locals" to preserve and to utilize
fully the monopolistic time and place advantages they enjoy on the floor.
That time and place advantage gives them a decided competitive advantage
over other traders. Unfortunately, even that competitive advantage is fre-
quently viewed to be insufficient and fraudulent or abusive practices are
engaged in by floor members. Those practices are difficult to detect and
prosecute because of the shroud of secrecy that envelopes the club-like
atmosphere of the floors.
Floor brokers who execute customer orders under their monopoly fran-
chise also benefit from the absence of competition. These "independent"
floor brokers are supposed to represent the interests of the brokerage firm
customers on whose behalf they are executing orders. They are supposed
EXTENT AND EFFECTS OF FUTURES TRADING By PERSONS POSSESSING MATERIAL, NONPUBLIC
INFORMATION, SUBMITTED TO THE COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESEN-
TATIVES AND THE COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION AND FORESTRY OF THE SENATE
PURSUANT TO SECTION 23(B) OF THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT, AS AMENDED (Sept. 1984).
Recently, however, a surge of trading activity took place in the coffee futures market just
before Brazil halted its coffee exports. This again raised the question of whether insider trading
prohibitions in the futures markets are needed. See Bruce, Brazilian Committee to Probe
Alleged Coffee Insider Trading, J. COM., Mar. 27, 1991; Tanouye, Powers & Salwen, Insider
Trading on the Coffee Exchange? It's No Crime, Wall St. J., Apr. 29, 1991, at C16, col. 4;
Tanouye & Michaels, U.S. Regulators Probe a Surge in Coffee Trades, Wall St. J., Mar. 25,
1991, at Cl, col. 6; see also United States v. Dial, 757 F.2d 163, 165, 168 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 838 (1985); Lambert & Semel, CEF Firms, Traders Indicted on Fraud
Charges, Wall St. J., June 5, 1991, at C20, col. 3 (reporting that traders were indicted for
trading in advance of customer orders, which allegedly allowed defendants to profit from price
increased caused by customer orders).
The CFTC has conceded that noncompetitive trading "undermines the public's confidence
in the futures markets by contributing to the suspicion that insiders are controlling the market
for their own benefit." In re Gilchrist, 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 25,024 at 37,805-6
(C.F.T.C. 1991). Nevertheless, it is fighting proposals to prohibit insider trading in the futures
industry. See Salwen, Lone Wolf at CFTC Bares Teeth, Wall St. J., Mar. 27, 1991, at C1,
col. 3 (reporting that "deep-pocketed futures industry" is joining with CFTC in fighting efforts
to include insider trading prohibition in Commodity Exchange Act). The House of Represen-
tatives, however, has approved a bill that would, among other things, prohibit individuals
from using nonpublic information regarding their firm's commodity transactions to profit for
their own accounts. See H.R. REP. No. 102-6, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1991).
For an example of rules that would prohibit abusive "insider" practices, see Markham,
"Front-Running"-Insider Trading Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 38 CATH. U.L. REv.
69, 124 (1988). See also Note, Trading in Commodity Futures Using Nonpublic Information,
73 GEo. L.J. 127 (1984); but see Booth, Insider Trading, Better Markets, Wall St. J., June
28, 1991, at A12, col. 4 (contending that insider trading on futures exchanges justifies legalizing
use of insider information on securities markets).
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to do this by obtaining the best possible price in the pit. The Chicago sting
operation suggests that, in fact, many floor brokers are more concerned
with simply obtaining executions at any pride so that they can earn their
commissions without liability for errors. Moreover, to avoid liability for
errors, mistakes are often covered up or paid back by cheating customers.
These practices are fostered by Section 4 of the Commodity Exchange
Act, which establishes a monopoly position for the exchanges in the trading
of commodity futures contracts. The exchanges limit the number of their
members, thereby limiting access to the floors of the exchanges. The value
of this monopoly right is reflected in the high cost of exchange memberships.
The economic costs of this monopoly are also reflected in the noncompetitive
practices exposed by the Chicago sting operation.
Reform is needed in the regulation of commodity futures contracts.
Section 4 of the Commodity Exchange Act should be eliminated and the
provisions of the Act which give the CFTC exclusive jurisdiction over
futures contracts should be either softened or eliminated. By effecting these
changes, the commodity futures markets will become more competitive. The
changes will also allow the development of off-exchange instruments to
proceed unimpaired, provided there is effective alternative regulation such
as that found in the federal securities laws. Competition from the securities
exchanges would help assure that the trading practices uncovered by the
Chicago sting operation are not carried forward in the future. These changes
will also eliminate the "franchise' of exchange members who now have a
statutory monopoly that gives them a time and place advantage over all
other traders without any commensurate market obligations.
In addition, the Commodity Exchange Act should be amended to require
that the Board of Governors of the commodity exchanges be composed of
a majority of individuals who represent the public and who are not asso-
ciated with exchange members. The Act should also mandate, to the extent
possible, that exchanges make membership available to everyone who meets
minimum financial requirements and standards of integrity.
Exchange trading mechanisms must also be updated. As demonstrated
by the Chicago sting operation there is a strong need for an automated
small order execution system. In addition, large order executions such as
those used on the securities exchanges should be introduced to the com-
modity futures industry to provide alternate mechanisms for the execution
of large orders. A curb market needs to be created and as many aspects of
the trade as possible should be automated. Further, traders on the floors
of the commodity exchanges should be required to assume market maker
obligations, and there should be an automated limit order book maintained
by an independent entity-i.e., someone who is not associated with the
floor brokers and floor traders in the pit.
Congress should further amend the Commodity Exchange Act to provide
the CFTC with statutory authority to adopt regulations defining particular
fraudulent practices. These regulations should be specific in their content
and directed at identified practices, such as those uncovered by the Chicago
sting operation. By imposing such specificity, prosecutions can be conducted
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more effectively and traders will be advised specifically of what conduct is
permitted or prohibited.
These proposals would represent dramatic changes in the commodity
futures industry. This industry has flourished for some 125 years and it has
been one of the most innovative areas of the financial services industry. It
has also experienced phenomenal growth in recent years. m That phenomenal
growth, however, has brought the importance of the commodity futures
industry to a new level in our commerce. Today, a broad number of persons
are involved in or are affected by the commodity futures market in some
way. The significance of these markets now makes it imperative that they
be regulated in an effective manner. The Chicago sting operations have
disclosed that effective regulation is not existent today. The proposals
described above, however, would bring the commodity exchanges to a
regulatory level comparable to that in the securities industry. Without these
changes, one can safely predict that the conduct exposed by the Chicago
sting operation will continue on the exchange floors, particularly as the
memory of those prosecutions dim.
222. Manipulation continues to be a problem in the futures industry. See Markham, supra
note 9 (containing general discussion of manipulation); Taylor, U.S. Looks Into Claim of
'Leak' of Market-Moving Weather Data, Wall St. J., July 16, 1991, at Cl, col. 4 (discussing
possible price manipulation from weather service leaks); Taylor & Kilman, In CBOT's Grain
Pits, July Can Be the Cruelest Month, Wall St. J., July 18, 1991, at Cl, col. 3 (discussing
prior manipulations).
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